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YOU CAN'T TAKE IT WITH YOU: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSEQUENCES OF INTERSTATE GENDER-IDENTITY
RULINGS
Julie A. Greenberg* & Marybeth Herald**
Abstract: Recent U.S. decisions establishing a person's legal sex have adopted a
kaleidoscope of approaches that range from the procreative (a man must be able to fertilize
ovum and beget offspring, while a woman must be able to produce ova and bear offspring),
to the religious (gender is immutably fixed by our Creator at birth), to the scientific (gender
itself is a fact that may be established by medical and other evidence). Under current laws
and state court rulings, a male-to-female transsex person is legally a woman in approximately
one-half of the states and legally a man in the other half. This Article discusses the
constitutional implications of these varied approaches to determining a person's legal sex. It
concludes that states that refuse to recognize a transsex person's sex as indicated on an
amended birth certificate from a sister state violate principles of full faith and credit and
unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to travel under the Dormant Commerce Clause. In
addition, when states impose tests that are based on gender stereotypes and force people to
live as the sex that conflicts with their self-identified sex, they violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection and substantive due process mandates.
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INTRODUCTION
Male and female represent the two sides of the great radical
dualism. But in fact they are perpetually passing into one
another. Fluid hardens to solid, solid rushes to fluid. There is no
wholly masculine man, no purely feminine woman. - Margaret
Fuller'
When Margaret Fuller wrote about the fluidity of gender, she was
obviously referring to gendered personalities and not biological or
anatomical sex. Her writings in the nineteenth century were more
prescient than she could have imagined. Twenty-first-century science is
now confirming that biological sex may be as fluid as gender behavior.
Although most people have purely male or purely female biologic traits,
millions of people have a mixture of male and female attributes.2
I. WOMAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1845), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/

etext05/womanI 0.txt.
2. No one knows exactly how many people's sex is ambiguous, and estimates vary widely. A
recent survey of the medical literature from the last half of the twentieth century estimates that the
number of people who deviate from the sexually dimorphic norm may be as high as 1-2% of live
births. See ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY 53 (2000); Melanie Blackless et al., How
Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review & Synthesis, 12 AM. J. OF HUM. BIOLOGY 151 (2000). Another
expert maintains that one of every 300 male births involves some kind of genital abnormality.
SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED 135 n.4 (1998). In In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68
(Md. 2003), the court cited studies estimating rates of intersex births from one per 37,000 to three
per 2000. Id. at 79. If 1-2% of the U.S. population is intersexed, that means that the law must
determine the legal sex of approximately five million people. The effect of these legal
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As long as laws continue to differentiate between men and women,
legal institutions will be required to determine exactly what makes a
man a man and what makes a woman a woman. Answering this question
has become especially critical as courts and legislatures seek to ensure
3
that marriage remains available to only opposite-sex couples.
Legal institutions could avoid establishing tests for determining who
qualifies as a male or a female for purposes of marriage if they were
willing to legalize same-sex marriages. If they want to continue to ban
same-sex couples from marrying,4 however, they need to grapple with
this definitional problem. Thus far, state legislatures have failed to
include tests for determining sex in their marriage statutes. Instead, they
have left it to the courts to determine a person's legal sex when a
marriage is challenged based upon a person's inability to qualify as a
husband or a wife.
In response to this challenge, U.S. courts have adopted a kaleidoscope
of approaches that range from the excessively restrictive (a man must be
able to fertilize ovum and beget offspring, while a woman must be able
to produce ova and bear offspring),5 to the religious (gender is
immutably fixed by our Creator at birth), 6 to the scientific (gender itself

determinations is even broader because it will also affect up to five million people who seek to
marry someone of ambiguous sex.
3. Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110
Stat. 2419 (1996). DOMA defines marriage at the federal level as a "legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife." 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). In addition, Congress has considered, but thus
far has failed to pass, a constitutional amendment defining marriage as "consist[ing] only of the
union of a man and a woman." S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong.
(2003). Most state statutes define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. In addition,
eighteen states have approved constitutional amendments limiting marriage to heterosexual unions
and at least an additional eleven states are considering adopting such an amendment. Kaven
Peterson, Same-sex unions--a constitutional race, STATELINE.ORG, Sept. 8, 2005,
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=136&languageld=I &contentld=20695.
4. Thus far, only one state, Massachusetts, has ruled that the state must allow same-sex couples
the right to marry. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). No other
court or legislature has imposed a similar requirement and most states have adopted statutes or
constitutional amendments specifically banning same-sex marriage. See infra note 202.
5. See In re Estate of Gardiner (GardinerI1), 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002), rev'g In re Estate of
Gardiner (Gardiner 1), 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (referring to dictionary definitions of
"Male" and "Female").
6. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) (finding that sex status is
determined at the time the birth certificate is recorded but introducing the opinion with the
following question: "[C]an a physician change the gender of a person with scalpel, drugs and
counseling or is a person's gender immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?").

Gender Identity Across State Lines
7
is a fact that may be established by medical and other evidence).
In other countries, judicial and legislative acts determining whether a
transsex 8 person is legally a male or a female have been much more
consistent. Reversing decades of precedent, which typically resulted in
discriminatory treatment of transsex people, 9 international legal
institutions have begun to recognize the legal right of gender selfdetermination. For example, in 2002, the European Court of Human
Rights ruled that states that deny transsex persons the right to be
recognized as their self-identified sex violate Articles 8 and 12 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. 10 In 2004, the European Court of Justice made a
similar ruling," and Great Britain, which for decades had been one of
the countries that provided sparse protection to transsex persons, passed
legal rights that recognize and protect a
sweeping legislation to provide
12
person's self-identified sex.
As courts and legislatures in the United States adopt diverse and
contradictory approaches to defining male and female, the results can be
bizarre and confusing when transsex people cross state lines only to find
that their legal sex has changed according to the laws of a given
jurisdiction. 13 Under current legislation and state court rulings, a male-

7. See Heilig, 816 A.2d at 79.
8. The term "transgendered" is typically used to refer to anyone who does not fit into clear sex
and/or gender categories. It includes transsex and intersex persons, as well as cross dressers and
others who cross traditional gender boundaries. For purposes of this article, the term "transsexual"
or "transsex person" refers to a person whose gender identity is not congruent with his or her
biological birth markers, including chromosomes, gonads, internal and external morphology,
hormones, and phenotype. An intersex person is someone whose biological markers are not clearly
all male or all female.
9. See, for example, Attorney Gen. v. Kevin, (2003) 172 F.L.R. 300 (Austl.), which rejected the
holding in In the Marriage of C. and D. (falsely called C.), (1979) 35 F.L.R. 340. See also Case of l.
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25680/94, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 53 (2003), and Goodwin v. United
Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, which rejected the approaches in Rees v. United Kingdom, 106
Eur. Ct. H.R. (1987), Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990), and Sheffield &
Horsham v. United Kingdom, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011.
10. See Case of I. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25680/94, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 53 (2003);
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
11. Case C-117/01, K.B. v. Nat'l Health Serv. Pensions Agency, 2004 E.C.R. 1-541.
12. See Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7 (Eng.).
13. A transsex person's legal sex for purposes of marriage varies by state. See supra notes 10939 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the marriage cases. In addition, a
person's sex within a state could vary depending upon the issue being litigated. Courts may change
the test for sex depending upon the purpose for which the term is being defined. The meaning of the
terms "sex," "male," and "female," have been litigated in the following areas: marriage validity,
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to-female transsex person is legally a woman in approximately one-half
of the states and legally a man in the other half. 14 This situation raises a
myriad of complicated legal questions. For example, if a male-to-female
transsex person chooses to marry a man in New Jersey' 5 and a woman in
Kansas, 16 could she be prosecuted for bigamy in either state? Can she
file federal or state joint tax returns with both spouses? If her spouse
dies, can she inherit as a surviving spouse in both states?
More important than these questions of statutory law are the complex
constitutional issues that are raised by these contradictory statutes and
rulings. This Article explores the constitutional implications of the
varied approaches to determining a person's legal sex. Part I explains
why sex determination is a complicated medical subject that legal
authorities must fully understand before they create rules for
determining a person's sex. Part II provides a summary of the different
legislative enactments and judicial approaches to sex determination. Part
III provides an in-depth analysis of the constitutional implications of
these rulings under the Full Faith and Credit, Dormant Commerce, Equal
Protection, and Substantive Due Process clauses. Part III then argues that
the current state-by-state sex-determination approach, which results in
some people's sex changing when they cross state borders, violates all of
these constitutional requirements. When courts refuse to recognize an
amended birth certificate from a sister state, they violate principles of
full faith and credit and unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to
travel under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Furthermore, when states
impose sex tests that are based on gender stereotypes and force people to
live as the sex that conflicts with their self-identified sex, they violate
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and substantive due
process mandates. As the science of sex and gender continues to evolve,
the critical determination of a person's sex must take into account these
complex constitutional issues.

official documents, discrimination law, equal protection law, the right to participate in athletic
events as a female, the right to be housed with other females in prison, and the ability and obligation
to serve in the military. For a thorough discussion of these issues, see generally Julie A. Greenberg,
Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L.
REV.265 (1999).
14. See infra Part ll.B.1.
15. A male-to-female transsex person is legally a woman in New Jersey and can legally marry a
man. See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 211 (N.J. 1976).
16. A male-to-female transsex person is legally a man in Kansas and can legally marry a woman.
See GardinerH, 42 P.3d 120, 137 (Kan. 2002).

Gender Identity Across State Lines
I.

THE MEDICAL DETERMINANTS OF SEX HAVE EVOLVED
TO REFLECT SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS

Until sex reassignment surgery became available in the latter part of
the twentieth century, legal institutions were not asked to determine
whether a person was legally a man or a woman. Although recognition
of the existence of intersex persons (formerly known as hermaphrodites)
dates back to ancient Greek mythology,1 7 early religious tracts, 1 8 and
English jurists from the sixteenth century,1 9 legal institutions did not
begin to wrestle seriously with this issue until a little more than thirtyfive years ago.2 ° Similarly, until medical authorities began to understand
the complex nature of sexual differentiation, medical literature on sex
determination was also sparse. It was during the late nineteenth century
and the early twentieth century that physicians began to try to establish
what makes a man a man or a woman a woman.21
Medical experts now recognize that at least eight attributes contribute
to a person's sex. These factors include genetic or chromosomal sex,
gonadal sex (reproductive sex glands), internal morphologic sex
(seminal vesicles, prostate, vagina, uterus, fallopian tubes), external
morphologic sex (genitalia), hormonal sex, phenotypic sex (secondary
sexual features such as facial hair or breasts), assigned sex and gender of

17. Hermaphroditus was the son of Hermes and Aphrodite. The nymph Salmacis fell in love with
him and entwined her arms around him and the gods molded the two bodies together. Ovid,
Salmacis and Hermaphroditus, in THE POETRY ARCHIVE, http://www.poetry-archive.com/o/
salmacis and-hermaphroditus.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
18. For example, ancient Jewish texts that set forth the rules governing relationships and
behaviors among Jews discuss in detail the responsibilities of "androgynos" and "hermaphrodites."
Rabbi Alfred Cohen, Tumtum and Androgynous, J. OF HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y, Fall 1999,
http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/english/journal/cohen-l.htm. An early religious tract also referred to the
ability of a hermaphrodite to contract marriage. See Henry A. Finlay, Sexual Identity and the Law of
Nullity, 54 AUSTRL. L.J. 115, 120 n.51 (1980) (quoting JOSEPH FREISEN, GESCHICHTE DES
KANONISHEN EHERECHTS 343-45 (Tibingen, Verlag & Druck von Franz Fues 1888)).
19. In the sixteenth century, Lord Coke, in writing about the laws of intestacy, stated: "Every
heire is either a male, or female, or an hermaphrodite, that is both male and female. And an
hermaphrodite (which is also called Androgynus) shall be heire, either as male or female, according
to that kind of the sexe which doth prevaile." 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 8.a (Philadelphia, Johnson, Warner & Fisher 1812).
20. The earliest and probably the most cited case involving a marriage in which one of the parties
was a transsex person was decided in England in 1970. See Corbett v. Corbett, (1970) 2 All E.R. 33
(P.).
21. See ALICE D. DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX 27-28
(1998) [hereinafter DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES].
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rearing, and gender identity.22 For most people, these eight factors are
congruent and sex determination is not controversial. Millions of people,
however, do not have congruent sex attributes and for them sex
determination becomes problematic.2 3 Although medical experts now
agree that these eight factors all contribute to a person's sex, the
attributes that have been used to differentiate men from women have
varied over time and the issue is still a matter of great controversy. 24
A.

In the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, Sex Was
Determinedby the Gonads

During the nineteenth century, scientists understood that male and
female embryos begin with the same basic sexual features. They also
knew that these sex attributes begin to differentiate in utero and continue
to differentiate after birth.25 By the 1870s, researchers understood that
the female fetus's gonads develop into ovaries, while the male fetus's
gonads become testicles. In addition, they knew that all fetuses start with
both Mullerian and Wolffian systems. 26 In females, the Wolffian system
22. See JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES: A GUIDE TO
COUNSELING CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 4 (2d ed. 1994).
23. For a thorough discussion of sexual differentiation and intersex conditions, see Greenberg,
supranote 13, at 278-92.
24. Medicine and law are not the only disciplines that have modified their sex test over time.
Since the 1960s, when the International Olympic Committee (IOC) became concerned that some
male athletes were trying to compete as women, the Olympic officials performed tests to determine
whether female athletes were really males. They first tested sex by having the athletes parade nude
in front of a panel of gynecologists. Simon Kuper, When Sex Not Drugs Rocked the World of
Athletics, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 31, 2004, at 12. When sex chromosomes and the means to easily
test the chromosomal structure became available, the Olympic officials switched to a buccal smear.
If the buccal smear showed that a female athlete's chromosomal make-up was anything other than
XX, she could be barred from the competition. See Albert de la Chapelle, The Use and Misuse of
Sex Chromatin Screeningfor Gender Identification of Female Athletes, 256 JAMA 1920, 1920-21
(1986). The Olympic organizers abandoned routine sex testing for female athletes for the 2000
games in Sydney because they recognized that it is impossible to define with certainty who is a
woman and who is a man. Kuper, supra, at 12. In addition, the IOC now allows male-to-female
transsex persons to compete as females if they meet certain criteria. Steve Nearman, Transsexual
Ruling will Haunt IOC, WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, at C 13.
25. DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES, supra note 21 at 34.
26. Embryos start with neutral gonads that will later differentiate and become either female
(ovaries) or male (testicles). In addition, they start with two duct systems, Mullerian and Wolffian.
If the fetus is XX, no hormones are released and the Mullerian ducts develop into fallopian tubes,
uterus, and upper portion of vagina, and the Wolffian ducts disappear. If the fetus is XY, the gonads
produce both Mullerian Duct Inhibitor, which causes the Mullerian duct to disappear, and
testosterone, which causes the Wolfflan ducts to develop into the epididymis, vas deferens, and
seminal vesicle. ROBERT POOL, EvE'S RIB: THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF SEX DIFFERENCES 67
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atrophies and the Mullerian system develops into the fallopian tubes,
uterus, and vagina. In males, the Mullerian system atrophies while the
27
Wolffian system develops into the deferent canals and the prostate.
Although medical experts of this era knew that a variety of
anatomical criteria could be used to determine a person's sex, they
28
decided that the gonads should be the critical marker. Therefore, they
declared that people with ovaries are women and people with testicles
are men. This singular focus on gonadal tissue, to the exclusion of other
known sex attributes, was probably influenced by the critical role that
the gonads play in the reproductive process. 29 During this time, many
doctors argued that the organs that are responsible for the production of
the spermatozoa and the ova are what truly differentiate men from
women. 30 The "Age of the Gonads" was short-lived, however, and
within fifty years, the focus began to shift to another sex attribute: the
genitalia.
B.

In the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, Medical Experts
Believed that GenitaliaDetermined Sex

By the middle of the twentieth century, medical experts had rejected
the gonads as the "true" sex indicator and instead started to focus on the
appearance of the external genitalia. 3 1 Before the 1950s, if a newborn
emerged with ambiguous genitalia, doctors would assign a sex to the
infant that they believed was most appropriate and would not otherwise
surgically or hormonally alter the child. 2
During the middle of the twentieth century, however, the idea that
gender identity was based upon nurture and not nature became the
conventional wisdom. 33 In other words, most doctors, sociologists, and

(1994).
27. DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES, supra note 21, at 34.

28. Id. at 150. By the end of the nineteenth century, medical experts in Great Britain and France
believed the gonads were the true indicator of a person's sex. Before that time, medical experts
employed a variety of tests. Id. at 139-46.
29. Id. at 150-51.
30. Id. at 151.
31. Alice Domurat Dreger, A History of Intersexuality: From the Age of Gonads to the Age of
Consent, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 345, 349 (1998) [hereinafter Dreger, History ofIntersexuality].
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Joan G. Hampson et al., Hermaphroditism: Recommendations Concerning Case
Management, 4 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 547, 549 (1956); John Money et al.,
An Examination of Some Basic Sexual Concepts: The Evidence of Human Hermaphroditism, 97
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psychologists believed that children were bom without a sense of a male
or female gender and that gender identity would develop consistently
with the appearance of the child's genitalia and the gender role in which
the child is raised.3 4 Therefore, beginning in the 1950s, the standard
protocol for treating newborns with ambiguous genitalia changed to a
model of surgical alteration of "unacceptable" genitalia into "normal"
genitalia.
Normal genitalia for boys required an "adequate" penis.35 If doctors
believed that the child had an adequate penis, the child was assigned the
male role. A child without an adequate penis would be assigned the
female role.36 The penis became the essential determinant of sex because
medical experts believed that a man could only be a true man if he
possessed a penis that was capable of performing two acts: penetrating a
vagina and being used to urinate while standing. 37 Medical technology at
this time was capable of creating an "adequate" vagina (defined as one
that was capable of being penetrated by an adequate penis), but the
technology was not advanced enough to create a fully functional penis
(one that was capable of penetrating a vagina). Therefore, surgeons
would typically turn XY infants with small penises or infants with other
genital ambiguity into girls.3 8
Under this protocol, some XY infants were surgically and hormonally
altered and raised as girls because of the dominant belief that growing up
BULL. JOHNS HOPKINS HOSP. 301, 309 (1955).

34. See Hampson et al., supra note 33, at 549; Money et al., supranote 33, at 308-09. In 1973, an
article in Time Magazine stated that "conventional patterns of masculine and feminine behavior can
be altered. [This study] casts doubt on the theory that major sex differences, psychological as well
as anatomical, are immutably set by the genes at conception." Milton Diamond & Keith
Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment at Birth: Long-Term Review and Clinical Implications, 151
ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 298, 299 (1997) (quoting Biological Imperatives,

TIME, Jan. 8, 1973, at 34). The study that Time Magazine was referring to was the report on the
gender development of David Reimer. In 1997, the report was exposed as false. Diamond &
Sigmundson use a pseudonym for David Reimer in their article. See infra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this study.
35. For a phallus to qualify as an adequate penis, most clinicians require that it be 2.5 centimeters
(one inch) when stretched at birth. Alice Domurat Dreger, A History ofIntersex: From the Age of
Gonads to the Age of Consent, in INTERSEX IN THE AGE OF ETHICS 12 (Alice Domurat Dreger ed.,

1999).
36. Alice D. Dreger, "Ambiguous Sex"--or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical Issues in the
Treatment of Intersexuality, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June 1998, at 24, 27-28 [hereinafter
Dreger, Ambiguous Sex].
37. Id. at 29.
38. See, DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES, supra note 21, at 181-84; KESSLER, supra note 2, at 19;

Dreger, Ambiguous Sex, supra note 36, at 27-28.
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as a boy with an "inadequate" penis was too psychologically traumatic
to risk. Some XY infants who had fully functional testicles and were
therefore capable of reproducing had their ability to reproduce destroyed
rather than raising them with a penis that was considered smaller than
the norm. 39 XX infants with a phallus that appeared to be more similar to
a penis than a clitoris were treated differently.4 ° Instead of
recommending that these children be raised as boys, doctors would
surgically reduce the phallus to a size that they considered acceptable for
a clitoris, even though the surgery might reduce or destroy the person's
ability to have satisfactory sex. 4 1 In other words, the dominant protocol
required that males be able to engage in acceptable sexual acts by
penetrating a female's vagina. Females, however, had to be able to
procreate if possible, even if they could not fully enjoy the act that leads
to procreation.
C.

By the Turn of the Century, Scientific Developments Indicatedthat
the Brain and Early HormonalInfluences Play a Key Role in
DeterminingSex

During the latter part of the 1990s, a number of people began to
question seriously the premises underlying the dominant treatment
protocol for infants born with "ambiguous" genitalia. Although many in
the medical community still believe that surgical and hormonal
alteration of infants should be the norm, 42 many authorities, including
experts in a variety of disciplines and intersex activist organizations,
believe that the brain plays the primary role in determining gender selfidentity. They are advocating an alternative approach to gender
assignment. They have called for either a moratorium or a limitation on
the use of infant genital surgery.43 One of the primary reasons why they
39. Dreger, Ambiguous Sex, supra note 36, at 28.
40. An acceptable clitoris is one that is less than one centimeter in length. Phalluses between one
and 2.5-3 centimeters are considered unacceptable and must be surgically altered under current U.S.
medical practice. ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY 59 (2000).
41. Id. at 61.
42. This model is still followed by the majority of physicians and recently received the support of
the American Academy of Pediatrics. See Comm. on Genetics, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Evaluation
of the Newborn with Developmental Anomalies of the External Genitalia, 106 PEDIATRICS 138
(2000).
43. See, e.g., DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES, supra note 21, at 200 ("[C]hildren born intersexed can

grow into adults who are comfortable with their bodies .. " When they reach the age of consent
they should be allowed "to choose, if they so desire, surgical and hormonal treatments ....
");
KESSLER, supra note 2, at 131 ("We need to consider different possibilities about how to manage
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advocate a change to the current protocol is because recent studies of
gender-identity development indicate that gender identity may be more
dependent upon brain function and hormonal influences than the
appearance of the genitalia. 4
For example, in 1997, Milton Diamond and Keith Sigmundson
published a follow-up report on David Reimer, a male infant who had
been surgically altered and raised as a female after a botched
circumcision in infancy irreparably harmed his penis. 45 Early reports
about David indicated that he had happily adjusted to being raised as a
girl, named Brenda. The earlier reports were exposed as false in the 1997
article.4 6 Despite surgical and hormonal intervention and raising David
as a female, David had always thought of himself as a boy. As a teen, he
chose to have surgery and hormonal treatment so that he could return to
living as a male.4 7 In other words, despite the fact that David was told he
was a girl, was raised as a girl, took female hormones, and had female
genitalia and a female body, he still believed he was a boy. 48 This study
and other similar reports show that gender identity is not as malleable as

intersexuality, including the possibility of not managing it at all."); Justine M. Schober, Feminizing
Genitoplasty for Intersex, in PEDIATRIC SURGERY AND'UROLOGY: LONG TERM OUTCOMES 549,
556-57 (Mark D. Stringer et al., eds., 1998) (calling for extreme care in the determination); Hazel
Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: Should Physicians
Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?,7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1,
63 (2000) ("Waiting to see what the child desires is the most sensible approach .. ");Anne
Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes, Revisited, SCIENCES, July-Aug. 2000, at 19, 21 ("[S]urgery on
infants should be performed only to save the child's life or to substantially improve the child's
physical well-being."); William Reiner, To be Male or Female-ThatIs the Question, 151 ARCHIVES
OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 224, 225 (1997) ("In the end it is only the children themselves
who can and must identify who and what they are.").
44. Other reasons that also justify calling a halt to such surgeries include: the surgeries are not
medically necessary; the surgeries often result in scarring and pain; additional surgeries are often
required; the surgeries often interfere with sexual satisfaction; the children often suffer from stigma
and trauma by being treated as abnormal and in need of fixing; medically unnecessary surgery
should not be used to relieve the anxiety of the parents of the intersex child; and the child's sense of
autonomy may be harmed when she is old enough to understand the procedure and its
consequences. See Julie A. Greenberg, Legal Aspects of GenderAssignment, 13 ENDOCRINOLOGIST
277 (2003).
45. See Diamond & Sigmundson, supra note 34. For a more complete story of David Reimer's
life, see JOHN COLAPINTO, AS NATURE MADE HIM: THE BOY WHO WAS RAISED AS AGIRL (2000).
46. See Diamond & Sigmundson, supranote 34.
47. Id. at 300.
48. Sadly, David Reimer committed suicide in 2004, soon after his identical twin brother
committed suicide. Colin McClelland, Canadian Who was Born as Boy, Raised as a Girl Commits
Suicide, SEATTLE TIMES, May 13, 2004, at A-10.
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was once believed.4 9
More recent studies continue to confirm that gender identity has less
to do with physical attributes and more to do with brain development. In
2004, William Reiner and John Gearhart published a study tracing the
gender-identity development of sixteen genetic males who were born
with severe phallic inadequacy. 50 Following the dominant treatment
protocol at the time, fourteen of the sixteen children were assigned the
female sex and underwent surgical modification. Two were raised as
males without any surgical intervention. The study indicated that the two
children who were raised as males had an unambiguous male identity.
Of the fourteen children raised as females, five were living as females,
three were living with unclear gender identity (although two of the three
had declared themselves male), and eight were living as males. 51 The
researchers concluded that the appearance of the genitalia and the gender
of rearing do not necessarily comport with a person's gender selfidentity.52 They found that the effect of prenatal androgens on the
developing brain appears to be a major determinant of the development
of a male identity.53 They acknowledged that more research is necessary
to determine the exact process that leads to gender identity because "the
specific mechanisms of the development of male sex itself remain
largely unknown. 54
Two recent studies of the brains of transsex persons also indicate that
gender identity has a neurobiological basis.55 Researchers examined a
portion of the brain that is understood to be sexually dimorphic. 6 They
49. See, e.g., Susan J. Bradley et al., Experiment of Nurture: Ablatio Penis at 2 Months, Sex
Reassignment at 7 Months, and a Psychosexual Follow-up in Young Adulthood, 102 PEDIATRICS 1
(1998) (reporting on a boy who was turned into a girl at seven months who self-identifies as a
bisexual female with recreational and occupational interests more typically identified with males);
Bernardo Ochoa, Trauma of the External Genitalia in Children: Amputation of the Penis and
Emasculation, 160 J. UROLOGY 1116 (1998) (describing a study of seven children in Colombia that
was conducted between 1960 and 1995).
50. William G. Reiner & John P. Gearhart, DiscordantSexual Identity in Some Genetic Males
with CloacalExstrophy Assigned to FemaleSex at Birth, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 333 (2004).
51. Id. at 333.
52. See id. at 336-37.
53. See id. at 340.
54. Id.
55. Frank P.M. Kruijver etal., Male to Female Transsexuals Have Female Neuron Numbers in
the Limbic Nucleus, 85 J. OF CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 2034 (2000); Jiang-Ning

Zhou etal., A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and Its Relation to Transsexuality, 378 NATURE
68 (1995).
56. Kruijver et al., supra note 55, at 2034.
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found that the brains of male-to-female transsex persons were more
similar to female brains than male brains.57 The researchers concluded
that sex differentiation of the brain could sometimes go in the opposite
direction of the sexual development of the genitalia.58 In other words,
brain sex may not comport with genital sex due to neurobiological
factors that exist during development.5 9
Based on these recent studies, a number of experts have concluded
that gender identity may be formed in the womb based upon the
developing brain's response to hormonal levels in utero. There is
evidence suggesting that the brain differentiates into "male" and
"female" brains, just as the fetus's rudimentary sex organs differentiate
into "male" and "female" genitalia. 61 Thus, some experts have rejected
the dominant protocol of the late twentieth century that required genitalconforming surgery.
The scientific understanding of gender-identity formation continues to
advance. The nineteenth century's singular reliance on the gonads
shifted in the twentieth century to a model of a malleable gender identity
that is dependent in large part on the appearance of the external
genitalia. Although some experts still accept this model, recent studies
indicate that the brain and early hormonal influences play a significant
role in gender-identity formation. Although further studies are needed to
fully understand this complex issue, current research confirms that
gender identity is influenced by prenatal factors and that the eventual
adult gender identity of an infant cannot necessarily be accurately
predicted.
II.

THE LEGAL DETERMINANTS OF SEX DO NOT ALWAYS
MIRROR THE MEDICAL DEFINITIONS OF SEX

Just as the medical determinants of sex have developed over time, the
legal definitions of "male" and "female" have also varied.62 The legal
57. Id.
58. See id. at 2039-41.
59. See Zhou et al., supra note 55.
60. See Reiner & Gearhart, supra note 50, at 334.
61. See Diamond & Sigmundson, supra note 34, at 303 (quoted with approval in In re Heilig, 816
A.2d 68, 76 (Md. 2003).
62. This Article focuses on how sex is determined for purposes of marriage. Legal institutions
may vary their test for sex determination depending upon the issue involved. For example, a person
may be able to alter the sex indicated on her driver's license and passport so that the sex indicator
reflects the holder's appearance, but a court may still rule that the sex legally indicated on an
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sex determinants, however, have not necessarily reflected the scientific
and medical advances that have enhanced our understanding of sex
determination. Many legal institutions, including legislatures in more
than twenty European countries, the European Court of Human Rights,
the European Court of Justice, courts in Australia and New Zealand, and
some state courts and legislatures in the United States, rely on scientific
developments to guide them in their formation of the rules to determine
legal sex. Other legal institutions, including many U.S. state courts, rely
on a variety of other factors. Some recent decisions have ignored
scientific developments about gender-identity formation in favor of
Webster's dictionary,63 references to God,64 and references to older
decisions that do not reflect the current understanding of sexual
differentiation.6 5
A.

From 1970 to 1995, the Sex Assigned at Birth Typically
DeterminedLegal Sex

England was the first jurisdiction to rule on the issue of sex
determination for purposes of marriage. The 1970 case of Corbett v.
Corbett66 involved a post-operative male-to-female transsex person who
married a male. After only fourteen days together, the husband filed for
a declaration that the marriage was void because it was an invalid samesex marriage. The court engaged in a lengthy, in-depth analysis of the
of transsexualism and
aspects
and psychological
medical
intersexuality. 67 Although the court acknowledged that medical
professionals use more factors to determine the appropriate sex in which
an individual should live, the court used only three factors to determine a
person's sex for the purposes of marriage: chromosomes, gonads, and
genitalia.68 According to the Corbett court, chromosomal pattern,
official document may be different from the person's sex for purposes of marriage. See, e.g.,
Gardiner11, 42 P.3d 120, 126, 137 (Kan. 2002). J'Noel Gardiner's birth certificate, driver's license,
passport, health documents, and records at two universities indicate that J'Noel is a female, yet the
Kansas Supreme Court determined that for purposes of marriage, she is a male. Id. at 123, 137. See
Greenberg, supranote 13, at 308-25, for a discussion of sex determination for other purposes.
63. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Gardiner II, 42 P.3d 120, 132-33 (Kan. 2002); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223,
227 (Tex. App. 1999).
66. (1970) 2 All E.R. 33 (P.).
67. Id. at 42-46.
68. Id. at 44-45. In support of the test it developed, the court cited medical professionals who
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gonadal sex, and genitalia define an individual's "true sex." 69 Because
the transsex wife had male chromosomes (XY) at birth and at the time of
the trial and male gonads (testicles) and genitals (penis) at birth, the
court ruled that she was still legally a male for purposes of determining
if her marriage to a man was legal. 70 The court opined that an
individual's biological sex was assigned at birth and, barring an error,
could not later be changed either medically or surgically.7"
After the decision in Corbett, most of the courts that were asked to
determine a person's legal sex for purposes, of marriage followed
Corbett and decided that transsex persons remain the sex they were
assigned at birth. During the next twenty-five years, courts in New

York, 72 Ohio, 73 Canada,74 Singapore, 75 and South Africa 76 ruled that
testified that individuals with congruent chromosomes, gonads, and genitalia are not true
intersexuals if only their hormones or psychological sex are incongruent with these three factors.
Other experts testified that transsexuals should be classified as intersexuals. See id. at 45.
69. Id. at 48. Until 2002, courts in England continued to apply this three-part test. See, e.g., S.-T.
(formerly J.) v. J., (1998) Fam. 103, 117; Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1987),
overruled by Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Cossey v. United Kingdom,
184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990).
70. Corbett, 2 All E.R. at 48. In this case, all three factors were congruent so the court held that
the respondent's sex was unambiguous. In many intersex conditions, these three factors are not
congruent. The court acknowledged that its test may be difficult to apply in a case of intersexuality,
and stated in dictum that greater weight should be given to genital criteria in such a case. See id.
71. Id. at 47.
72. In Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971), the court invalidated a
marriage between a male and a male-to-female transsex person. It did not state which factors should
be used to determine sex, but opined that "mere removal of the male organs would not, in and of
itself, change a person into a true female." Id. at 500. Three years later, in FrancesB v. Mark B,
formerly known as Marsha B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974), the court invalidated a
marriage between a woman and a post-operative female-to-male transsex person. Once again, the
court did not determine which factors should be used to determine sex. It held that physical
incapacity for sexual relations is grounds for an annulment and determined that the transsex
husband did not have the "necessary apparatus to enable defendant to function as a man for
purposes of procreation." Id. at 717.
73. In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Prob. 1987) (holding that a post-operative male-tofemale transsex person still retained male chromosomes and therefore could not marry in the female
role because she was still legally a male).
74. In C. (L.) v. C. (C.), [1992] 10 O.R.3d 254, a female-to-male transsex person who received
hormone treatment, underwent a hysterectomy, and had her breasts surgically removed, married a
woman. The court annulled the marriage and held that he could not qualify as a legal male because
the external genitalia still appeared female. This decision is difficult to reconcile with the decision
in M. v. Al. (A.) [1984] 42 R.F.L. (2d) 55, 59-60 (P.E.I.),
where the court held that a non-operative
female-to-male transsex person who had all female attributes except her gender self-identity was
male and could not legally marry a man because she had a latent inability to engage in heterosexual
intercourse with a man.
75. Lim Ying v. Hiok Kian Ming Eric, [1991] SLR Lexis 184 (ruling that a person's legal sex is

Gender Identity Across State Lines
post-operative transsex persons are legally the sex listed on their original
birth certificate. In addition, the European Court of Human Rights held
that a country's failure to allow post-operative transsex persons to marry
in their self-identified gender role does not violate the Convention for
7
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
The most disturbing ruling during this time came from a court in
called C.), 78
Australia. The case, In the Marriage of C. and D. (falsely
involved a husband who was a true "hermaphrodite" with an XX
chromosomal pattern and a combination of male and female biological
aspects. 79 The couple had been married for twelve years and had raised
80
two children, who were not the biological children of the husband. The
husband had undergone a number of surgeries to "correct" his external
sex organs and to remove his breasts so that his external appearance
would be male. The court granted the wife's petition for annulment on
the grounds of mistake because she believed she was marrying a male.
Although the husband had male gonads and genitalia, he had the
chromosomal configuration typical of a female.8 1 Therefore, the court
concluded that he was neither a male nor a female.
During this time, only two jurisdictions, New Jersey 82 and New
Zealand,8 3 specifically rejected the Corbett test and used gender self84
the New
identity to determine a person's legal sex. In M.T. v. .T.,
Jersey court conducted an in-depth analysis of how to determine an
individual's sex for purposes of marriage. The court ruled that the post-

established at birth and does not change based upon medical intervention).
76. In W. v. W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W.L.D.) at 313-14, the court voided a marriage between a male
and a post-operative male-to-female transsex person. Even though the marriage had been
consummated, the court held that the wife had only "artificial" attributes of a woman and was
therefore only a "pseudo-type of woman" who could not marry a man.
77. See Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011; Cossey v. United
Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990); Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1987), overruled
by Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
78. (1979) 35 F.L.R. 340, overruled by Attorney Gen. v. Kevin (2003) 172 F.L.R. 300.
79. Id. at 342.
80. Id. at 341.
81. Id. at 345. The court stated: "I am satisfied on the evidence that the husband was neither man
nor woman but was a combination of both, and a marriage in the true sense of the word... could
not have taken place and does not exist." Id. As a non-man/non-woman, the implication of this
court's holding is that he could not marry anyone at all.
82. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. 1976).
83. Attorney Gen. v. Otahuhu Family Court, [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 603 (H.C.).
84. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. 1976).
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operative male-to-female wife was a woman for purposes of determining
the validity of the marriage.85 The court acknowledged that several
criteria might be relevant in determining an individual's sex.86 It also
declared that in most instances external genitalia might be the most
significant determinant of sex classification at birth.87 The court
distinguished sex classification at birth from other areas and found that
for purposes such as public records, service in the military, participation
in athletic competitions, and eligibility for certain kinds of employment,
other tests in addition to genitalia may also be important.8 8 The court
decided that the most humane and accurate test for "true sex" for
purposes of marriage would be to analyze both anatomy and gender
identity.89 If the genitalia conform to a person's gender identity, psyche,
or psychological sex, then that will be the true sex for purposes of
marriage. 90
Similarly, in Attorney General v. Otahuhu Family Court,91 the High
Court of Wellington in New Zealand ruled that, for purposes of
marriage, post-operative transsex persons acquire their post-operative
sex. The court recognized that marital law in New Zealand had shifted
away from focusing on sexual activity and now placed more emphasis
on the psychological and social aspects of sex.92 The court criticized the
Corbett decision for its emphasis on chromosomes, genitalia, and gonads
as well as for its failure to recognize the overriding importance of social
and psychological factors.93
B.

Currently, Sex Determinants Vary by State

A number of jurisdictions allow amendments to the sex indicated on a
birth certificate. In some jurisdictions, legislatures have adopted statutes
allowing persons whose gender identity does not match the sex indicated
on their birth certificates to amend the sex indicated on their birth

85. See id. at 208-10.
86. See id. at 208-09.
87. Id. at 208.

88. Id. at 209.
89. See id.
90. Id. According to this court, because sexual capacity is necessary for consummation of a
marriage, the genitalia must be capable of sexual intercourse. Id.
91. [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 603 (H.C.).
92. Id. at 606.
93. Id. at 607.
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records. In the absence of such a controlling statute, courts have
rendered contradictory opinions. Some courts have reviewed the
scientific literature and placed the greatest emphasis on "brain sex" or
gender identity. Other courts have continued to follow the earlier
decisions and have chosen to ignore the importance of gender selfidentity and the scientific evidence in their rulings.
1.

Twenty-Five JurisdictionsHave Adopted Statutes Allowing
Transsex Persons to Amend the Sex on Their Birth Records

In the United States, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia
have adopted statutes that specifically allow transsex persons to amend
94
their official documents to reflect their self-identified sex. Most of

these states require proof of a surgical sex modification.9 5 In addition to
these twenty-four states, another four states, Kansas, Maine, Nevada,
birth
and New York, have not passed legislation, but will issue amended
96
certificates after surgery through an administrative process.
Other jurisdictions have adopted statutes allowing modifications to
the birth record, but it is unclear in these jurisdictions whether the statute
authorizes an amendment to the birth record following gendermodification surgery. Eighteen states have general statutes authorizing
birth certificate amendments, including a change to the "sex"
designation.9 7 Although these statutes could be interpreted to include
94. See ALA. CODE § 22-9A-19(d) (Supp. 2004); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-337 (Supp. 2005);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-307(d) (Supp. 2005); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 103425, 103430
(West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-115(4) (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a42 (West Supp. 2005); D.C. CODE § 7-217(d) (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-23(e) (Supp. 2005);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 338-17.7(a)(4)(B) (LexisNexis 2004); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 535/17(1)(d) (West Supp. 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144.23(3) (West Supp. 2005); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 213.121(5) (West 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:62 (Supp. 2005); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH--GEN. § 4-214(5) (LexisNexis 1995); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 46, § 13 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2831 (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 193.215(9)
(West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-604.01 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:840.12(a) (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14-25(D) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 130A-1 18(b)(4) (2003); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.235(4) (West Supp. 2005); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 26-2-11 (West Supp. 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-269(E) (Supp. 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 69.15(1) (West Supp. 2004).
95. Some states may allow other treatments or medical procedures. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 144.23(3); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-2-11; VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-269(E).
96. See Lambda Legal, Amending Birth Certificates to Reflect Your Correct
http://lambdalegal.com/ (search "Amending Birth Certificates") (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).

Sex,

97. ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.320 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3131 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 382.016 (West 2002); IND. CODE § 16-37-2-10 (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.218(4) (West
2005); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-57-21 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-15-204 (2003); N.H.
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post-surgical sex modification amendments, a court in Texas, interpreted
its state's birth certificate amendment statute to be limited to
amendments for "inaccuracies" in the original recording and not
inaccuracies due to later changes of sex.98 Finally, only one state,
Tennessee, has adopted legislation specifically forbidding a change to
the birth certificate to accommodate the results of sex-modification
surgery. 99

In sum, one U.S. state legislature specifically bans a legal change of
sex. Twenty-nine U.S. jurisdictions (twenty-eight states plus the District
of Columbia) specifically authorize a legal sex change for transsex
persons by statute or administrative ruling. In the remaining twenty-two
states, which have no legislation or only a general birth certificate
amendment statute, the determination of legal sex for the purposes of
marriage is left to the courts.
2.

Courts Differ as to the Factorsthat Determine Sex

Recent court decisions determining sex for purposes of marriage have
adopted a variety of approaches. Most jurisdictions outside of the United
States have rejected the outdated tests used in earlier judicial decisions
and have focused on the scientific literature and the importance of brain
sex to the development of gender identity.' 00 A number of lower courts
in the United States have also followed this approach, but most of these

REV. STAT. ANN. § 126:23-a (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-02.1-25 (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 1-321 (West 2004); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §450.603 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-3-21
(2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-63-150 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §34-25-51 (2004); TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 191.028, 192.011 (Vernon 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5075 (2000);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-24 (LexisNexis 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-424 (2005).
98. In Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999), the Texas Court of Appeals
ignored the ruling of a trial court that allowed a post-operative male-to-female transsex person to
amend her birth certificate pursuant to the statute. The court decided that the male sex designation at
birth was true and accurate. It chose to ignore the trial court ruling because it decided that the trial
court's role was purely ministerial and did not involve fact-finding or considerations of the public
policy involved. Id.
99. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2001).
100. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Kevin (2003) 172 F.L.R. 300 (Austl.), overruling In the Marriage
of C. and D. (falsely called C.) (1979) 35 F.L.R. 340. Twenty-one European countries permit postoperative transsex persons to change their legal sex and marry in their self-identified gender role.
The European Court of Human Rights identified twenty countries in 2002. Goodwin v. United
Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. Since that time, the Parliament of Great Britain approved
similar legislation, Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7 (Eng.), so that post-operative transsex
persons are now treated as their post-operative sex in twenty-one European nations.
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cases have been reversed on appeal.1 °1
In 2002, the European Court of Human Rights specifically rejected its
earlier decisions 102 that had relied on an outdated understanding of
gender-identity formation.' 0 3 Similarly, in 2003, an Australian court
04
specifically rejected the approach it had taken in its earlier decision.' In
determining that a female-to-male transsex person was a male for
purposes of marriage, the Australian court held that the plain meaning of
05
the word male includes a post-operative female-to-male transsexual.1
Given the recent scientific evidence on gender-identity formation, the
Australian court concluded that the fact that a person's eventual gender
identity "cannot be physically determined at birth seems to us to present
a strong argument... that any determination at that stage is not and
should not be immutable."' 0 6 Courts in England followed Corbett for
that
thirty-five years, 107 until Parliament adopted legislation in 2004
08
treats transsex persons as their self-identified sex for all purposes.1
Developments in United States courts have generally followed the
opposite path of the courts of other countries. During the past decade,
the issue of the validity of a marriage in which one of the parties is a
transsex person has been litigated in courts in California, Florida,

101. See infra notes 109-20 and accompanying text.
102. In Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1986), Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (1990), and Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that a country's failure to allow a post-operative
transsex person to marry as her self-identified sex does not violate Articles 8 and 12 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In 2002, the ECHR
rejected the approach taken in these cases and found that such rulings violate Articles 8 and 12.
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
103. See 1. v. United Kingdom [Eur. Ct of H.R. 2002] 36 E.H.R.R. 53; Goodwin v. United
Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
104. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text for a thorough discussion of the earlier case,
In the Marriage of C. andD. (falsely called C.) (1979) 35 F.L.R. 340, overruled by Attorney Gen. v.
Kevin (2003) 172 F.L.R. 300.
105. Kevin, 172 F.L.R. at 364.
106. Id. at 348.
107. The most recent decision from England to follow Corbett is Bellinger v. Bellinger, (2003) 2
All E.R. 593 (H.L.) (appeal taken from A.C.). At the time Bellinger was decided, the English
Parliament had already started to consider the issue. The Bellinger court believed that whether a
transsex person's legal sex could be changed was a matter properly before the Parliament and
should not be decided by the court.
108. See Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7 (Eng.).
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Kansas, Ohio, and Texas. The California'0 9 and Florida 1 1° trial courts
held that post-operative transsex persons acquire their self-identified sex
as their legal sex. The California trial court decision was not appealed,
but the Florida case was reversed on appeal."' In addition, the Kansas
Court of Appeals ruled that sex determination should include selfidentified sex as a factor, but this decision was also reversed on
appeal. 1 2 The Supreme Court of Kansas,' 1 3 the Court of Appeals of
Florida,1 4 the Court of Appeals of Texas,1 5 and the Court of Appeals of
Ohio 1 6 all ruled that for purposes of marriage, transsex persons remain
forever the sex that was assigned to them at birth.
U.S. courts that allowed transsex persons to marry in their selfidentified gender role used reasoning that was very similar to the
approaches taken in the decisions in other countries. In detailed
118
opinions, the Florida trial court 1 7 and the Kansas Court of Appeals
conducted a thorough review of the medical and legal literature on
transsexualism. Both courts rejected earlier sex-determination decisions
that followed Corbett.'19 The Kansas court rejected the earlier decisions
as "a rigid and simplistic approach to issues that are far more complex
120
than addressed."'
Most U.S. appellate courts that have addressed the issue, however,
have not allowed transsex persons to marry in their self-identified gender
role. These courts rejected scientific advances and reached the same
109. See Transgender Ruling, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 26, 1997, at I (reporting denial of summary
judgment motion by Superior Court judge in Vecchione v. Vecchione, Civ. No 96D003769).
110. See In re Marriage of Kantaras v. Kantaras (Kantaras1), No. 98-5375CA (Fla. Cir. Ct., Feb.
21, 2003), http://www.transgenderlaw.org/cases/kantarasopinion.pdf, rev'd, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
111. Kantaras v. Kantaras (KantarasII), 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
112. Gardiner1,22 P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001), revd,42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
113. Gardiner I, 42 P.3d at 214.
114. Kantaras1, 884 So. 2d at 161.
115. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230-31 (Tex. App. 1999).
116. In re Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
31, 2003).

117. See
Kantaras I,
No.
98-5375CA
(Fla.
Cir.
Ct.,
Feb.
21,
2003),
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/cases/kantarasopinion.pdf, rev'd, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
118. See Gardiner1,22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001), rev'd, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
119. Id. at 1110; Kantaras I, No. 98-5375CA, at 766-71 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Feb. 21, 2003),
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/cases/kantarasopinion.pdf, rev'd, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
120. Gardiner1, 22 P.3d at 1110.
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conclusion as the Corbett court for a number of reasons. They relied on
religious rhetoric,' 22 or expressed a desire
the plain meaning rule, 1211 used
23
to defer to the legislature.
A number of courts have relied on rules of statutory construction, in
particular the plain meaning rule, to determine the legislative intent
behind statutes that limit marriage to one man and one woman. Although
some courts have relied on the plain meaning rule to determine who is a
man and who is a woman, reliance on this rule has led to contradictory
results. For example, the Australian Court of Appeals 1 24 and the Florida
trial court1 25 believed that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word
126
"male" encompassed a post-operative female-to-male transsexual.
Courts in Ohio,127 Kansas, 128 and Florida, 129 however, found that the
plain meaning of the terms "male" and "female" could be found in the
dictionary. The Kansas Supreme Court quoted Webster's dictionary and
determined that "'[m]ale' is defined as 'designating or of the sex that
fertilizes the ovum and begets offspring: opposed to female.' 'Female' is
defined as 'designating or of the sex that produces ova and bears
offspring: opposed to male."",130 In other words, these courts have
implied that those who cannot fertilize and beget are not true men and
women. 13 1
those who cannot produce ova and bear offspring are not true
121. See, e.g., GardinerII, 42 P.3d at 135; Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *6. The plain meaning
rule generally assumes that words should be interpreted in accordance with their common usage and
meaning.
122. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex. App. 1999).
123. See, e.g., id. at 224; GardinerII, 42 P.3d at 136; Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *6; Kantaras
II, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
124. Attorney-General v. Kevin (2003) 172 F.L.R. 300.
21,
2003),
Feb.
Cir. Ct.,
(Fla.
795
at
125. Kantaras I, No. 98-5375CA,
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/cases/kantarasopinion.pdf, rev'd, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
126. Kevin, 172 F.L.R. at 364 ("[T]he words man and woman when used in legislation have their
ordinary contemporary meaning ....That meaning includes post-operative transsexuals as men
and/or women in accordance with their sexual reassignment.") (citations omitted).
127. Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *6.
128. GardinerI1, 42 P.3d at 135.
129. KantarasII, 884 So. 2d 155, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
130. Gardiner11,42 P.3d at 135 (emphasis in original).
131. These definitions may come as a big shock to the millions of people who cannot bear or
beget. Infertility affects approximately 6.1 million women and their partners in the U.S., which is
about 10% of the reproductive-age population. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 1997 FACT SHEET-NEW REPORT DOCUMENTS TRENDS IN
CHILDBEARING, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroon/97facts/
nsfgfact.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
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Some judges also rejected scientific literature and instead utilized
religious rhetoric to support their decision. 132 The Texas Court of
Appeals recognized that sex determination involves profound
philosophical, 133 metaphysical, 134 and policy concerns. 35 Despite these
profound concerns, the court phrased the legal question as: "[C]an a
physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and
counseling, or is a person's gender immutably fixed by our Creator at
birth?' ' 136 Ultimately, the court decided that transsex persons must
37
remain the sex assigned to them at birth. 1
Finally, all the recent decisions in which courts refused to allow
transsex persons to legally adopt their post-operative sex were grounded
in a finding that the courts did not have the power to determine the test
for legal sex in the face of legislative inaction. 38 Although the
legislative histories in these jurisdictions indicate that the legislatures
had not considered or discussed the issue of sex determination for
transsex persons, these courts decided that legislative silence is
equivalent to legislative disapproval. 3 9
Although courts and legislatures outside of the United States are now
ruling that transsex persons should be treated legally as their postoperative sex, courts within the United States have failed to follow their
lead. 140 Although some U.S. courts and jurists may consider
international views to some degree,' 4' others consider international
132. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. App. 1999).
133. See id. at 224.
134. See id. at 231.
135. See id. at 230.
136. See id. at 224.
137. See id. at 231.
138. See Kantaras II, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); GardinerII, 42 P.3d 120,
136 (Kan. 2002); In re Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *6 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 31, 2003); Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230.
139. See KantarasII, 884 So. 2d at 161; GardinerII, 42 P.3d at 136; Nash, 2003 WL 23097095,
at *6; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230.
140. United States courts are not bound by decisions outside of the United States, nor are they
obligated to follow the European Court of Human Rights' interpretation of a Convention to which
the United States is not a signatory. Similarly, Australia is not bound by those Conventions, but
when faced with a similar issue, an Australian court noted that the changing views in the
international community commanded attention. Attorney Gen. v. Kevin (2003) 172 F.L.R. 300, 353
(noting that failure to recognize the post-operative sex of a transsex person would be adoption of a
position of "international isolation").
141. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons,__ U.S. _
, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (Mar. 1, 2005) (opinion
of Kennedy, J.) ("It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international
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42 Even ignoring international opinion, 143
isolation to be irrelevant.
however, the current treatment of transsex persons by U.S. courts raises
serious constitutional concerns in a number of areas.

III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SEXDETERMINATION RULINGS

Transsex, and possibly intersex, individuals are legally considered
male in about one-half of the states and legally considered female in the
other half.144 Thus, as transsex people cross state lines, their legal sex
145
also transforms.
changes and whom they are entitled to marry legally
These state sex-determination rulings implicate a number of
constitutional provisions and raise several issues:
9 Must a state's determination of legal sex be recognized by a sister
state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause?

opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the
instability and emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime.... The
opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and
significant confirmation for our own conclusions."); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003)
(opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of
the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct."); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002) (opinion of Stevens, J.) ("Within the world community, the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is
overwhelmingly disapproved."); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Border: The
Value of a Comparative ConstitutionalAdjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REv. 1 (2003). But see Atkins,
536 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Equally irrelevant are the practices of the 'world
our people.").
community,' whose notions ofjustice are (thankfully) not always those of
majority's note of
Lawrence
of
the
context
in
the
stated
142. As Justice Antonin Scalia recently
international opinion on the subject of sexual privacy rights, "[t]he Court's discussion of these
foreign views... is ...meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since 'this Court... should
not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."' Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 n. (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
143. Countries other than progressive European countries have also changed their attitude toward
sex determination. For example, Iran's Islamic government, which for decades discriminated
against transsex persons, is now recognizing people with sexual-identity disorders and allowing sex
modification surgery and issuing new birth certificates to those who have transitioned. Some
Muslim clerics, who dominate the judiciary in Iran, are recommending sex-change operations to
those whose gender identity does not comport with the sex assigned to them at birth. See Nazila
Fathi, Sex Changes are GainingAcceptance in Iran, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 3, 2004, at 2.
144. See supra Part II.B.1.Thus far, no court has determined whether the legal sex of an intersex
person can be changed if her adult gender identity does not comport with the sex assigned to her at
birth.
145. Currently, there is only one state, Massachusetts, where legal sex is irrelevant because the
state recognizes a person's right to marry either a woman or a man. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
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" Do contradictory sex-determination rulings that require transsex
persons to alter their legal sex as they cross state borders impinge
on their right to travel freely under the Dormant Commerce
Clause?
" Do state sex-classification systems that rely on chromosomes, the
ability to reproduce, or sex stereotypes violate the Equal
Protection Clause?
" Does a state's failure to recognize a post-operative transsex
person's self-identified sex as her legal sex violate her right to
substantive due process?
These fundamental constitutional questions are discussed in the
remainder of this Article.
A.

The Full Faith and Credit Clause Requires States to Recognize the
Sex of Transsex Persons as Indicated on Their Amended Birth
Records

Immediately after being pulled from the womb, before fingers and
toes are counted, an infant's genitals are examined to determine whether
the child is a boy or a girl. This determination, made by a doctor or
midwife, controls the sex that will be listed on the infant's birth
certificate. 146 The sex assigned at birth is correct for the vast majority of
people. For a significant number of infants, however, the assignment
may not reflect the child's gender identity for two reasons: the infant
may have an unidentified intersex condition, or the assigned sex may not
147
match the person's gender self-identity.
Transsex people who are living in their self-identified gender roles
typically seek to amend the sex indicated on their birth certificates so
that their birth records will comport with their identities. Amendments to
birth records require government approval. As indicated in Part II.B. 1
more than half of the states have adopted procedures that allow transsex
persons to amend the sex indicated on their birth certificates.1 48 When
people with amended birth records travel to other states, they reasonably
expect that those states will consider them the sex indicated on their
official birth records. In some circumstances, however, states have
refused to recognize a transsex person's legal sex as indicated on the
amended birth record from a sister state. This refusal violates
146. Dreger, Ambiguous Sex, supra note 36, at 27-28.
147. Reiner & Gearhart, supra note 50, at 336.
148. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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constitutional principles of full faith and credit.
1.

When a Femalefrom Wisconsin Travels to Kansas, the Full Faith
and Credit Clause PrecludesKansasfrom TreatingHer as a Male

When J'Noel Gardiner was born, she was identified as a male on her
Wisconsin birth certificate. 149 After undergoing surgical and hormonal
treatment, J'Noel applied to have the sex on her birth certificate
amended to indicate that she is a female; the State of Wisconsin
approved the amendment. By virtue of this amendment, if J'Noel had
married a man in Wisconsin, Wisconsin would have treated them as a
heterosexual couple, entitled to all the state and federal benefits provided
to legally married couples. 150 As long as J'Noel and her husband never
left the state of Wisconsin, they could be confident that they would be
treated as all other heterosexual couples were treated. If, however, they
decided to move to a different state, they could not be certain that
another state would recognize that J'Noel was a female, as indicated on
her amended birth certificate. If a sister state refused to acknowledge
that J'Noel was a female, J'Noel would be considered a male, and her
marriage to her husband might be considered an illegal same-sex union.
Courts in Kansas,15 1 Florida,152 and Ohio 153 have reached this precise
result. Courts in each of these states have declared that transsex persons
cannot legally marry as the sex that comports with their self-identities
and their amended birth records. Thus, when a person such as J'Noel
travels across state lines, she puts into jeopardy more than one thousand
federal benefits, 54 as well as a myriad of state rights, 55 that are granted

149. Gardiner1,22 P.3d 1086, 1091 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001), rev'd, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
150. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 69.15(4) (West Supp. 2004) (providing for a change of sex on the
Wisconsin birth record after a "surgical sex-change procedure").
151. Gardiner11, 42 P.3d at 214.
152. KantarasII, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
153. In re Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 31, 2003).
154. "Federal Benefits" may be a bit of a misnomer because not all federal laws that apply only to
married couples are necessarily beneficial. The most prominent benefits of marriage relate to tax,
veteran, social security, and private-employee benefits that are limited to married couples under
federal laws. See JOSHUA K. BAKER, 1,000 FEDERAL BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE? AN ANALYSIS OF
THE 1997 GAO REPORT (2004), http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/iMAPP.GAO.pdf.
155. These rights include the ability to inherit, make end-of-life decisions for a spouse, sue for
wrongful death, claim spousal immunity, and seek spousal and child support in the event the
relationship terminates. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-57 (Mass.
2003) (detailing marital benefits).
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to married couples. In addition, even if J'Noel does not marry, if she
was legally
moves to a state that does not recognize that her sex
156
amended, she will be treated as a man for legal purposes.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
requires states to honor the judicial pronouncements of other states. 157 A
final judgment in one state, if rendered by a court with proper
jurisdiction, must be recognized in every other state.1 58 The Full Faith
and Credit Clause is intended to "alter the status of the several states as
independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations
of the others, and
created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings
' 159
to make them integral parts of a single nation."
For full faith and credit purposes, courts have drawn a distinction
between judgments and acts or records.160 Sister state judgments are
entitled to complete deference. The forum state cannot refuse to
recognize a judgment from a sister state court if the sister state court had
jurisdiction. The forum state must give full faith and credit to the
judgment even if it violates the forum state's public policy. U.S.
exception to the
Supreme Court decisions do not support a public policy
6'
judgments.'
afford
must
states
full faith and credit
Acts and records of other states, on the other hand, are accorded less
deference, presenting instead a choice of law question. The Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not require a state to defer to a sister state's
legislative acts or records if recognition would violate a strong public
policy of the forum state. 162 Full faith and credit does not require states
as expressed in their statutes, to the
to subvert their own public policy,
163
state.
another
of
policy
public
156. Although very few laws in the United States treat males and females differently, some
distinctions remain. For example, the federal Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451473 (2000), requires only men to register with the Selective Service System.
157. The clause provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
158. Baker v.Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
159. Id. at 232 (quoting Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 196 U.S. 268, 277 (1935)).
160. Id. at 233.
161. Id. at 233-34 (noting that the lower court "misread our precedent" by "assuming the
existence of a ubiquitous 'public policy exception' and emphasizing that past Supreme Court
decisions "support no roving 'public policy exception' to the full faith and credit due judgments").
162. Id. at 233.
163. Id. This right of the forum state is limited to situations in which the forum state has
sufficient contacts. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
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Therefore, whether a state should be required to recognize a transsex
person's "amended" sex, may depend upon whether the sex amendment
is accorded the weight of a judgment, entitled to total deference, or
merely a record or act, subject to the public policy exception. The
resolution of this issue may turn in large part on the statute authorizing
the amendment to birth certificates. Some states require a court order to
amend a birth certificate. 164 Other states, however, allow the birth
certificate to be amended when the applicant provides adequate
documentation, usually in the form 1of65 a physician's affidavit, to the
agency in charge of amending records.
2.

Court-OrderedAmendments to Birth CertificatesAre Entitled to
Full Faith and Credit in Sister States

Although judgments are entitled to full faith and credit, the fact that a
court issues an order authorizing an amendment to a birth certificate
does not necessarily mean that the order is equivalent to a judgment
entitled to full faith and credit. The Second Restatement of the Conflict
of Laws provides four factors to determine whether a judicial action is
entitled to full faith and credit. A judicial action is valid and entitled to
full faith and credit if: (1) the state rendering the decision has
jurisdiction over the parties; (2) the proceeding provides for a reasonable
method of notification and a reasonable opportunity to be heard; (3) the
and (4) the
court rendering the judgment has subject matter jurisdiction;
166
parties comply with the formalities of the rendering state.
Hearings to determine whether a court will authorize an amendment
to the sex indicated on a birth certificate meet these requirements for full
faith and credit. In the typical case, the last two requirements (a
164. See ALA. CODE, § 22-9A-19(d) (Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-307(d) (Supp.
2005); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE. §§ 103425, 103430 (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-2-115(4) (West 2005); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-217(d) (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-23(e)
(Supp. 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:62 (Supp. 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 193.215(9) (West
2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-604.01 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-

40.12(a) (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14-25(D) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 432.235(4) (West Supp. 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-2-11 (West Supp. 2005); VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-269(E) (Supp. 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 69.15(1) (West Supp. 2004).
165. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-337(A)(3) (Supp. 2005); RAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33817.7(a)(4)(B) (LexisNexis 2004); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 535/17(1)(d) (West Supp. 2005);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 144.23(3) (West Supp. 2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 46, § 13(e) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2831 (West 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-57-21

(West 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-1 18(b)(4) (2003).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92 (1971).
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competent court and compliance with proper procedures) will be
satisfied. Thus, in the usual case, two issues may arise. First, the court
must determine whether the sister state had the power to render the
decision. Second, the court must decide whether the person contesting
the decision has standing to challenge the earlier decision because she
neither received notice of, nor had an opportunity to be heard in, the
birth certificate amendment proceeding.
If granted such authority by the legislature, a court in the state that
issued the birth certificate has jurisdiction to grant an order amending
that certificate. A different result may be reached if the state that ordered
the change to the birth certificate did not have power over the agency
that is responsible for maintaining the birth records. For example, in In
re Heilig,167 a male-to-female transsex person sought a change of name
and sex from a court in Maryland, her current residence. Janet Heilig
was born in Pennsylvania, so the Maryland court did not have
jurisdiction over the agency responsible for keeping birth records in
Pennsylvania. 168 Therefore, the Maryland court could not order a change
to the birth certificate itself. The court ruled, however, that it had
jurisdiction to issue an order changing Ms. Heilig's sex. 16 9 If Ms.
Heilig's sex becomes an issue in a proceeding outside of Maryland, the
forum court could refuse to grant full faith and credit to the Maryland
court order. It could find that only the birth state has the power to amend
a person's legal sex status and that the Maryland court lacked proper
jurisdiction to determine Ms. Heilig's legal sex for any purpose outside
the state of Maryland.
The second requirement, that the proceeding provides for notice and a
reasonable opportunity to be heard, may also be problematic. The
hearing to change a person's legal sex is not pro forma; it requires the
petitioner to present evidence justifying a legal sex change and allows
those with an opposing interest to contest the change. 170 A person who
was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard in the initial
167. 816 A.2d 68 (Md. 2003).
168. Id. at 84.

169. Id. at 84-85 ("The jurisdiction of Maryland courts is not limited by the birthplace of the
parties seeking relief, however, so by recognizing the authority of the Circuit Courts to enter
gender-change declarations with respect to persons bom in Maryland, it necessarily recognizes as
well their jurisdiction to enter such orders on behalf of anyone properly before the court.").
170. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103430 (West 1996) ("[O]bjections may be filed
by any person who can, in those objections, show to the court good reason against the change of
birth certificate. At the hearing, the court may examine on oath the petitioner, and any other person
having knowledge of facts relevant to the application.").
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proceeding, however, could later seek to challenge the validity of the
judgment because judgments are typically not res judicata against
nonparties to the original proceeding.
Although most judgments are res judicata against only participants in
the original proceeding, determinations of a person's legal status
typically are binding on nonparties. 171 The Restatement of the Conflict
of Laws defines "status" as a legal personal relationship, not temporary
in its nature. 172 Although status usually refers to a legal relationship to
another person, such as husband-wife and parent-child, it may also
include an individual permanent condition created by law. 173 The law
typically requires that third persons refrain from disturbing another
person's legal status because the "legal establishment of status is a
socially important element of the legal order., 174 Thus, divorce
decrees,175 adoption orders, 176 and court determinations establishing a
child's paternity 177 typically are accorded full faith and credit and are
considered res judicata even against those who were not party to the

171. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 119 cmt. d (1934) ("The concern of third
persons in a status is indicated by the legal requirement that they must take it into account and
refrain from disturbing it.").
172. Id. Status is not defined in the Second Restatement.
173. See id. § 119 cmt. a.
174. Id. § ll9cmt. c.
175. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945) ("What is true is that all the
world need not be present before a court granting the [divorce] decree and yet it must be respected
by the other forty-seven States ....).
176. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay Parents Must Be Recognized by
Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Despite Anti-Marriage Statutes that
DiscriminateAgainst Same-Sex Couples, 31 CAP. U. L. REv. 751, 752 (2003) ("[A] valid, final
adoption decree rendered in one state establishing a parent-child relationship between the adoptive
parent(s) and the adoptive child(ren) must be recognized in every other state as equally valid as an
adoption decree rendered in that other state."); Robert G. Spector, The Unconstitutionality of
Oklahoma's Statute Denying Recognition to Adoptions by Same-Sex Couplesfrom Other States, 40
TULSA L. REv. 467, 475 (2005) ("[A]doption decrees and orders setting aside adoptions are final
judgments and are no more modifiable than a contract, tort, or other judgment of a court. As such, a
decree of adoption is entitled to the same full faith and credit protection as those judgments.");
Ralph U. Whitten, Choice of Law, Jurisdiction,and Judgment Issues in Interstate Adoption Cases,
31 CAP. U. L. REv. 803, 841 (2003) ("There is no question that states must give effect to the valid
adoption judgments of other states.").
177. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Overby, 613 So. 2d 128, 129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that a
Florida trial court was bound by full faith and credit and res judicata principles to honor a California
paternity decree and could not reopen the paternity issue); Ely v. DeRosier, 459 A.2d 280, 282
(N.H. 1983) ("If the issue of paternity already has been determined against the defendant in another
jurisdiction, such a judgment is deemed res judicata and generally will be afforded full faith and
credit ....).
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proceeding.17 8 Similarly, when a transsex person's legal sex status is
properly changed, third parties should not have standing to challenge the
legal change in status.
Further, states are required to grant the same rights to a person with
an amended legal status from another state that they grant to an
individual who has not amended her legal status. In other words, a court
in Kansas could not rule that it is recognizing an adoption order from
Wisconsin, but rule that the adoption order only changes the person's
status to a legally adopted child in Wisconsin, but not in Kansas.
Similarly, Kansas should not be able to rule that a male-to-female
transsex person is entitled to the rights of a female in Wisconsin, but is
granted the rights of a male in Kansas. A person's status is ascertained
by the law of the domicile that created the status, unless such status in
inconsistent with local law and policy. 179 Judicial orders amending the
sex indicated on the birth certificate should be granted the same respect
as other legal status change orders, such as divorce decrees, adoption
orders, and paternity determinations. When a birth certificate is amended
pursuant to a properly issued court decree, every other state should
recognize the amended legal sex status.
The need to recognize a divorce, adoption, or paternity decree from a
sister state is born of intensely practical considerations. If states fail to
recognize a change in legal status made in another state, a tangled web
178. If a judicial decision alters the legal relationship between the person seekirg to challenge the
status change and the person whose status has been changed, the rule is different. For example, if a
biological father does not receive notice and an opportunity to be heard in an adoption proceeding,
due process requires that he have standing to challenge the order that changed his legal status with
his biological child, but even this right is not absolute. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,
262-65 (1983) (rejecting putative father's claim that he was entitled to special notice of an adoption
proceeding because the court and the mother knew that he had filed an affiliation proceeding in
another court.) Thus far, when third parties have challenged an earlier sex-determination ruling, the
earlier ruling has not affected their legal status in relationship to the person whose sex has been
amended. See, e.g., Gardiner11, 42 P.3d 120, 121-22 (Kan. 2002) (allowing stepson to challenge
stepmother's legal status as a woman and a wife entitled to inherit from decedent's estate); Littleton
v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 225 (Tex. App. 1999) (dismissing wrongful death claim brought by
transsex wife against husband's doctor when doctor challenged the plaintiff's amended sex and thus
the validity of her marriage). Because the proceeding that granted the sex change did not affect their
legal status, these third parties should be treated the same way as challengers to other status change
determinations and should not be able to challenge the status change. Third parties challenging the
validity of a marriage typically have not had their requests granted. See Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v.
General Motors: Implicationsfor InterjurisdictionalRecognition of Non-TraditionalMarriages,32
CREIGHTON L. REv. 147, 156-57 (1998).
179. Watson v. Watson, 67 S.E.2d 704, 708 (Ga. 1951); Barrett v. Delmore, 54 N.E.2d 789, 79294 (Ohio 1944); Estate of Dreer, 173 A.2d 102, 106 (Pa. 1961); Martinez v. Gutierrez, 66 S.W.2d
678, 708 (Tex. Commn'n App. 1933).
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of status issues could result, leaving the parties and those close to them
in a legal and personal quagmire. When judicial proceedings involve
issues that are a matter of intimate concern and touch the basic interests
of society, other states should accord these judicial findings great
deference. 8 ° When states create a new legal status, public policy
concerns should weigh in favor of finding that status to be the same in
all jurisdictions. Otherwise, critical issues of parental status, support
obligations, and inheritance rights could be the subject of litigation,
upsetting the reasonable expectations of parties to a given relationship.
The same public policy reasons that support the rule that sister states
must recognize each other's divorce, adoption, and paternity decrees
apply to court orders establishing a person's sex. Allowing a person's
marital, familial, or sex status-and corresponding rights-to vary as a
person travels between states would violate the purpose underlying the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and profoundly affect personal rights of the
deepest significance.
3.

Amendments to Birth Certificates Granted Without a Court Order
Are Entitled to Recognition Unless a State Legislature Has
Articulated a Strong Public Policy Against Recognition

If an administrative official exercises her discretion and amends the
sex designated on an individual's birth certificate, full faith and credit
principles do not automatically require recognition by a sister state. 181
Although the person authorizing the amendment must determine whether
the statutory requirements are met, this act is likely a ministerial act, not
entitled to the same deference under full faith and credit principles as an
82
amendment ordered by a court after a full judicial proceeding.
Typically, the forum state grants full faith and credit to a sister state's
acts and records, unless doing so would violate the forum state's strong

180. See Williams, 325 U.S. at 230.
181. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003) (noting that recognition of
sister state judgments is exacting, while recognition of a sister state's statute is less demanding);
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) ("Our precedent differentiates the credit
owed to laws (legislative measures and common law) and to judgments.").
182. A court may choose to ignore an amended birth certificate issued by an administrator in its
own state if it finds that the administrator failed to gather the facts necessary to justify such an
amendment. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 310 (111.App. Ct. 2005)
(refusing to recognize that a female-to-male transsex person with an amended birth certificate was
legally male for purposes of marriage because of the absence of adequate fact finding).
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public policy. 183 Full faith and credit principles do not require states to

subordinate their public policy to the public policy of a sister state.184
Recognition of a sister state's laws and acts are resolved under
traditional conflict of laws principles.1 85 Thus far, only two cases
involving an amendment to the sex designation on the birth certificate
have discussed full faith and credit or conflict of law principles. 86 One
of these cases has been overruled, and neither
provides a careful in-depth
87
analysis of the legal principles involved. 1
Although few courts or scholars have analyzed the conflict of laws
principles applicable to birth certificate amendments, courts and legal
experts have fully explored the implications of sister-state recognition of
marriage licenses. Although a marriage certificate is not accorded the
same presumption of validity as a judicial proceeding, 188 a marriage,
valid where celebrated, is valid everywhere unless it is "obnoxious' ' 89 to
an important public policy of the forum state1 90 and the couple married
in the sister state to evade their domicile's stricter marriage rules. 191
Even in marriage-evasion cases, however, courts have tended to refuse
to invalidate the marriage if the 92
invalidation is sought by someone other
than the parties to the marriage.
183. Franchise Tax Bd., 538 U.S. at 494; Baker, 522 U.S. at 233.
184. Franchise Tax Bd., 538 U.S. at 494; Baker, 522 U.S. at 233.
185. Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 921, 923 (1998).
186. See Gardiner 1, 22 P.3d 1086, 1107-09 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001), rev'd, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan.
2002); In re Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *4-9 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 31, 2003).
187. For a complete discussion of the flawed reasoning in these cases, see Julie A. Greenberg,
When Is a Same-Sex MarriageLegal? Full Faith and Credit and Sex Determination,38 CREIGHTON
L. REV 289, 302-05 (2005).
188. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States'Interestin the Marital Status of Their
Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 25 (2000); Borchers, supra note 178, at 179; Larry Kramer, SameSex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the UnconstitutionalPublic Policy Exception, 106 YALE L. J.
1965, 1976 (1997).
189. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 507 (1941).
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) & notes (1971) ("A marriage

which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be
recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage."); Barbara J.
Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii,Are We Still Married When
We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1033, 1094-96.
191. Koppelman, supra note 185, at 961.
192. Borchers, supra note 178, at 156 ("Third parties challenging the validity of a marriageusually after one of the spouses has died in the hopes of cutting off the living spouse's inheritance
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In the marriage choice of law cases, courts have balanced the interests
of the forum state in enforcing its own public policy, the interests of the
sister state in having its marriages recognized, and the interest of the
couple in having their marriage recognized wherever they may travel or
live. 193 When they conduct this balancing, however, courts rarely
invalidate a marriage based on choice of law principles. The only
exceptions that courts have cited involve incest, age, polygamy, and
miscegenation restrictions, but even these exceptions rarely have caused
a court to refuse to recognize the marriage. 94 Furthermore, the public
policy exception to the marriage validity presumption has been shrinking
for a long time, in part due to judicial recognition that couples who
reasonably regard themselves as married should have their expectations
respected.195 Opposite-sex couples can reasonably expect their marriages
to be recognized wherever they may travel, given the universal legality
of their unions. Similarly, transsex people with amended birth
certificates from their birth states should be able to expect that their birth
certificates will be recognized when they enter another state. If they have
married in the sex role that matches the sex indicated on their birth
in an opposite-sex
certificates and consider themselves a spouse
96
reasonable.
is
expectation
marriage, such an
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the need
for stability and certainty in family relationships. As the Court stated in
Williams v. North Carolina: 197
[I]f one is lawfully divorced and remarried in Nevada and still
married to the first spouse in North Carolina,... a man would
have two wives, a wife two husbands.... Each would be a
bigamist for living in one state with the only one with whom the
other state would permit him lawfully to live. Children of the
second marriage would be bastards in one state but legitimate in
the other .... These intensely practical considerations emphasize
for us the essential function of the full faith and credit clause in

rights-have normally faced an uphill battle.").
193. Koppelman, supra note 185, at 923.
194. Id. at 945-49.
195. Id. at 944-46.
196. This same presumption would not be applicable to same-sex marriages. Only one state,
Massachusetts, allows same-sex marriages; many states have adopted mini-DOMAs explicitly
prohibiting same-sex marriage. See infra note 202. Thus, same-sex couples married in
Massachusetts could not reasonably expect their marriages to be valid outside of Massachusetts.
197. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 80:819, 2005

substituting a command for the former principles of comity and
in altering the "status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties"
by making them "integral parts of a single
98
nation."1
A forum state's recognition of an administrative agency's order to
amend the sex indicated on a birth certificate should be treated in the
same manner as courts currently treat marriage licenses. In other words,
absent a strongly articulated public policy, the sex indicated on an
individual's birth certificate should be recognized by all states as the
person's legal sex. As indicated in Part II.B. 1, twenty-nine jurisdictions
(twenty-eight states plus the District of Columbia) have articulated a
public policy that favors recognition of a legal sex change after a
medical procedure. 199 Twenty-two states have no relevant legislation or
have only a general birth-certificate-amendment statute that does not
specifically address sex modifications.200 Only one state, Tennessee, has
a clearly articulated public policy against allowing the sex on the birth
certificate to be modified.20 1 Legislative inaction does not indicate a
clearly articulated public policy because, by its nature, legislative
reasoning for inaction is neither clear nor articulated but rather a product
of ambiguous and inexplicable rationales. Thus, Tennessee is the only
state that could legitimately refuse to recognize an amended birth
certificate from a sister state based upon a clearly articulated public
policy. 20 2 Therefore, when a transsex person's*birth certificate reflects
her self-identified gender, all states, excluding Tennessee, should accord
her the legal rights that comport with the sex indicated on her amended
birth certificate.
In sum, when the birth state allows a transsex person to amend the sex
198. Id. at 299-302 (citations omitted).
199. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
201. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2001).
202. This situation contrasts sharply with state policy toward same-sex marriage where fortythree states (forty-two by statute or constitutional amendment and one by court ruling) have
expressly stated their policy against same-sex marriages. The following states ban same-sex
marriage: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin (via state supreme court ruling), and
Wyoming. See Kavan Peterson, 50-state rundown on gay marriage laws, STATELINE.ORG, Feb. 9,
2005, http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=1 36&languageld=1&contentld=
15966.
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designated on her birth certificate, principles of full faith and credit and
conflict of laws require sister states to recognize the amended sex. If the
amendment is authorized by a court order, the court order should be
treated in the same manner as adoption, divorce, and paternity decrees; it
should be accorded full faith and credit. Even if the amended birth
certificate is considered only an act or record, it should be treated the
same way that marriage licenses are treated; it should be recognized in
all states, with the possible exception of Tennessee, the only state that
°3
has a clearly articulated public policy against such recognition.
B.

The Right to Travel Protects the Right of Transsex Persons to
Enter Another State and Have Their Sex DesignationsRecognized

One of the core rights embedded in the United States Constitution is
the right to travel freely within the union. 2 ° 4 When states create
conflicting definitions of male and female, a transsex person's ability to
move freely from one state to another may be unconstitutionally
impeded. In approximately one-half of the states, transsex persons can
amend the sex indicated on their birth record and legally live in their
self-identified gender role.20 5 A state that requires a transsex person
moving to or through the state to relinquish her legal sex, as evidenced
on her amended birth certificate, unconstitutionally infringes upon her
ability to exercise her fundamental right to travel.2z 6 Specifically, under
203. The court should focus its inquiry on the state's policy regarding amending birth certificates
and not its public policy regarding same-sex marriage, as the court did in In re Nash, Nos. 2002-T0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003). In Nash, an Ohio
court refused to recognize Jacob Nash's amended birth certificate from Massachusetts indicating
Jacob's sex as male. The court, however, did not refer to its public policy regarding sex
amendments. Instead, it referred to the strong public policy in Ohio against same-sex marriages. Id.
at *6. Although Jacob Nash's birth certificate indicated that he was a male, the court concluded that
it did not have to issue the marriage license to a "same-sex" couple, thus implying that Jacob is
legally a female. Id. at *9. The Ohio court's reasoning on this issue was circular. Jacob was seeking
a same-sex marriage only if he was a female who wanted to marry another female. Whether he is
legally a female depends upon how a state ascertains a person's sex. Ohio's articulated public policy
against same-sex marriage cannot be used to establish Jacob's sex. Only an articulated public policy
against allowing sex modifications to the original birth certificate could be used to rebut the
information in the birth certificate indicating that Jacob is a male.
204. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (striking down a state limitation on welfare
benefits to new residents of the state).
205. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
206. We are a society whose citizens are often on the move, changing locations and residences
for business or personal reasons. See JASON SCHACHTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P23-204, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS: WHY PEOPLE MOVE: EXPLORING THE MARCH 2000 CURRENT POPULATION

SURVEY 2 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001 pubs/p23-204.pdf.
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the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state may not condition entry to that
state on the surrender of one's sex designation. Where state rules of sex
determination unduly burden commerce through a lack of uniformity,
the state rules must give way to the national interest in the smooth
movement of commerce.
For example, Wisconsin amended the birth certificate of J'Noel
Gardiner, a male-to-female transsex person, to indicate that J'Noel is a
female and thus could legally marry a male in Wisconsin. 207 As long as
J'Noel and her husband stay in Wisconsin, J'Noel's status as a married
woman is secure and stable. Travel beyond Wisconsin's borders,
however, carries the risk that another state will not recognize the sex
indicated on J'Noel's amended birth certificate. If a sister state refuses to
acknowledge the amendment, J'Noel will be considered a male, and her
marriage to her husband would be considered an illegal same-sex
union. 208 In addition, if they have children, the legal relationship to their
children may change. Thus, a move to a different state may exact a
heavy toll on J'Noel and her family. Even traveling through another state
may be risky. For example, if J'Noel and her husband were involved in
an automobile accident in a state that refuses to recognize her amended
birth certificate, her right to recover under a wrongful death or loss of
consortium statute, which only extends rights to married couples, could
be affected. 20 9 The risks that a transsex person and her spouse take in
traveling through or moving to another state are grave and the
consequences serious enough to hinder travel.
1.

The Right-to-TravelFramework Limits the Ability of States to
Impede Free Movement

The right to travel throughout the United States has been recognized
as a basic right under the Constitution, protected by a number of specific
provisions (e.g., the Citizenship Clause, the Privilege and Immunities
Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause) as well as the structure of

207. Gardinerl, 22 P.3d 1086, 1092 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001), rev'd, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
208. This result has occurred in a number of recent cases. See, e.g., Gardiner II, 42 P.3d at 13637; Kantaras I, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); In re Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149,
2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).
209. See, for example, Littleton v. Prange,9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999), where a Texas
court denied a male-to-female transsex wife the right to recover under a wrongful death statute
because the court determined that her seven-year marriage, which was performed in Kentucky, did
not qualify her as a wife entitled to recover under the statute.
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the Constitution. 210 Although the Constitution provides a framework that
allows the states to govern with some independence, it also recognizes
the need to reign in differences that hinder free movement and have the
potential to fragment the union into fifty different fiefdoms. Tension
between the states and the national government runs throughout the
1
history of the union and still shadows constitutional interpretation.
One clarifying moment in the debate came with the passage of the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that established our
national citizenship as primary. Effectively overruling Dred Scott v.
Sandford,212 the Citizenship Clause ended a critical controversy among
the states, which helped ignite the Civil War. It provides that persons
born or naturalized in the United States are primarily citizens of the
United States, and secondarily citizens "of the State wherein they
reside. 21 3 Union citizenship is predominant and state citizenship
derivative. The principles underlying the right to travel preserve the
value of our national citizenship, recognizing that at some points the
self-interest of individual states might be to set up barriers to entry.
Preserving the right to travel requires that these barriers be declared
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Saenz v. Roe 214 reiterated the
importance of the right to travel.2 1 5 The Saenz majority proclaimed that
"[i]t is a privilege of citizenship of the United States, protected from
state abridgment, to enter any State of the Union, either for temporary

210. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
35, 48-49 (1867).
211. Recent Commerce Clause decisions have reflected this tension. See Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (striking down a federal statute "commanding" state law enforcement
officers to carry out tasks under federal gun control law); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551
(1995) (invalidating the exercise of congressional Commerce Clause authority to ban guns near
school zones); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (prohibiting the federal
government from commanding state legislatures to pass laws).
212. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
213. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States .. "); Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 510 (1939)
(opinion of Roberts, J.) ("The first sentence of the Amendment settled the old controversy as to
citizenship .... Thenceforward citizenship of the United States became primary and citizenship of a
State secondary.").
214. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
215. Id. at 498 (striking down a state limitation on welfare benefits to new residents of the state).
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sojourn or for the establishment of permanent residence., 216 This free
access is "framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states
must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and
salvation are in union and not division. 2 17
The right to travel limits the ability of the states to place direct or
indirect barriers on free movement in at least three ways.2 18 The
Dormant Commerce Clause protects a citizen's right to enter or leave a
state. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment ensures that states cannot treat new residents as less than
full members of a state's community. Finally, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV protects the rights of visitors to a state.
Each aspect of protection is important to disabling barriers to travel.
Separately, these constitutional provisions protect different aspects of
the right to move freely within the union, and together they reinforce the
notion of one union and require the recognition of a citizen's sex
designation as established by a sister state.
No state has ever sought to impose different sex-determination rules
on its citizens as opposed to travelers or newly arrived citizens;
therefore, the privileges and immunities restrictions on travel are not
currently an issue in the sex-determination cases. A number of recent
decisions, however, have placed burdens upon a transsex person's ability
to move to another state because such a move would require the person
to alter her legal status as a male or female. Thus, the next section
examines whether sex-determination rulings that condition entry into the
state upon a legal change of sex unconstitutionally infringe on the right
to travel.
2.

The Dormant Commerce Clause Requires States to Respect the Sex
Designationon a ProperlyIssued Birth Certificatefrom a Sister
State

The Court has reaffirmed a right to travel "'not found in the text of
the Constitution,"' yet "firmly embedded in our jurisprudence., 2 19 The
most general guarantee of the right of travel is "the right to go from one
place to another, including the right to cross state borders while en
216. Id. at 511 n.27 (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
217. Id. at 511 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,523 (1935)).
218. Id. at 500-04.
219. Id. at 498 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966)).
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route., 220 Although various Constitutional provisions protect the general
right to travel within the United States, the principles of the Dormant
Commerce Clause provide the basic guarantees of free access that
should protect transsex persons who wish to move from one state to
another. Congress's Article I, Section 8 commerce power, which
affirmatively authorizes Congress to regulate commerce "among the
several States,",22' contains a complementary limitation on state power.
Even when Congress has refrained from legislating on a subject, the
courts may invoke the "dormant" component of the Commerce Clause to
preempt state laws that unduly burden interstate commerce. 222 Generally,
two basic types of issues provoke Dormant Commerce Clause problems:
protectionist state legislation that discriminates against out-of-state
interests 223

and

even-handed

state

statutes

that

unduly

burden

224

More specifically, the Supreme Court has held that the
commerce.
Dormant Commerce Clause prevents states from formulating different
rules if those differences will impede commerce because of
inconsistency in regulation.225 If uniformity is necessary, the Dormant
Commerce Clause forbids conflicting laws. Inconsistent definitions of
"female" and "male"--definitions that cause a person's sex to vary from
one state to the next-impede the ability to travel between states and
provide a classic case study of the need for uniform regulation.
Interstate travel by individuals is "commerce" for the purpose of the

220. Id. at 500.
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
222. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172-73, 176 (1941).
223. In situations such as these, the Court has ruled that such protectionist legislation will be
subject to "the strictest scrutiny." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979). Most
discriminatory statutes are found unconstitutional under this restrictive standard, a "virtually per se
rule of invalidity." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). But see Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (upholding a ban on the importation of bait fish after finding that this
"legitimate local purpose" could be achieved through no less restrictive alternative).
224. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 ("Where the statute regulates evenhandedly... it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.") (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
225. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989) (state statute that required out-of-

state beer shippers to affirm that their posted prices are no higher than the prices in the bordering
states had impermissible extra-territorial effect on commerce); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1986) (statute that required liquor sellers to set
price that was no higher than lowest price charged in the United States regulated out-of-state
transactions in violation of commerce clause); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662,
678-79 (1981) (striking down Iowa law that limited truck length as placing disproportionate burden
on out-of-state residents and businesses).
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Dormant Commerce Clause.22 6 The Supreme Court vindicated this right
in Edwards v. California.227 In striking down a California statute that
made it a misdemeanor to bring an indigent nonresident into the state,
the Court found that the California law placed an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce.228 California charged the defendant with
the crime of transporting his unemployed brother-in-law from Texas into
California.229 California defended its action on the basis that the brotherin-law was an undesirable, a pauper, and a "moral pestilence. 230 The
Supreme Court rejected the state's assertions that it could protect its
borders from citizens it considered unfavorable additions, finding that
such a right would not only invite retaliatory measures, but that "it
would be a virtual impossibility for migrants and those who transport
them to acquaint themselves with the peculiar rules of admission of
many States." 23'
If a state law or regulation does not target out-of-state commerce, but
still affects interstate commerce, the courts apply a balancing test:
"Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. 23 2 States that refuse to recognize a sister state's sex
designation do not stop commerce at the borders, as did the law in
Edwards. Rather, by refusing to recognize amended birth certificates, a
state impedes the flow of commerce by making it less likely that
individuals will cross into the state. Applied to transsex individuals, if a
transsex person is living as a female in one state and has married a man,
moving could put the marriage in jeopardy, as. well as her right to
custody of her children. If not married, she would be barred from
marrying a man and would be limited to marrying another female in the

226. See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 172 ("[l]t is settled beyond question that the transportation of
persons is 'commerce,' within the meaning of [the Commerce Clause]."); Camps Newfound/
Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 584 (1997) ("In determining whether the
transportation of persons is 'commerce,' we noted [in Edwards] that '[i]t
is immaterial whether or
not the transportation is commercial in character."' (citation omitted)).
227. 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941).
228. Id. at 177.
229. Id. at 170-71.
230. Id. at 177.
231. Id. at 176.
232. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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new state. In addition, while in the new state, all identity documents,
such as her driver's license, would be inconsistent with her physical
appearance and self-identity. Requiring transsex persons to alter their
legal sex and marital status to exercise their right to travel has the same
effect as prohibiting entry. It is certainly more onerous than taxing the
entry across the border, which the Supreme Court has found to be
unacceptable. 3
For example, when J'Noel Gardiner, a male-to-female transsex person
with a birth certificate that indicates her sex is female, decides to move
from Wisconsin to Kansas, the price imposed by Kansas is that she must
enter as a male and not a female.234 Even though her physical appearance
is female, she identifies and dresses as a female, and her Wisconsin
identity documents indicate that she is a female, travel to Kansas
effectively requires that she assume the identity of a male. Given the
consequences this requirement would impose on both her private and
public life, relocation to Kansas is essentially impossible for J'Noel.
In addition, the Supreme Court has struck down state legislation if
contradictory state statutes unduly burden commerce in areas where
uniformity is necessary. 235 If uniformity is essential, a state may not
interpose its own local rules.236 The Supreme Court has acknowledged
that application of this principle of uniformity is imprecise and the
results in each case will be fact-specific.237 For transsex persons who
want to cross state lines, the question for the court would be whether the
forum state's imposition of its own sex-determination rule, which
contradicts the sex established in the birth state, impermissibly
undermines uniformity and thus burdens the right of transsex persons to
travel under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
No court has addressed this issue in relation to sex determination. The
Supreme Court, however, has addressed an analogous scenario in terms
of race. In Morgan v. Virginia,238 the Court found a regulation requiring
bus passengers to separate by race so that members of different races did
not occupy contiguous seats violated the Commerce Clause. 239 The
233. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 39 (1867) (striking down a Nevada tax "upon
every person leaving the State" by a common carrier).
234. See Gardinerl, 42 P.3d 120, 137 (Kan. 2002).
235. See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377 (1946).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 377-78.
238. 328 U.S. 373 (946).
239. Id. at 386.
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Virginia statute that required this racial segregation also required that
passengers move seats during their journey if the ratio of "coloreds" to
"whites" on the bus changed, necessitating a shift in the size of the
"colored" and "white" sections. 240 The Court invalidated the regulation
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 24 1 noting that the need for
uniformity on the issue arose, in part, from the difficulty of defining a
person's race and from the myriad of different requirements in states
concerning separation by racial groups on public carriers. 242
The lack of a uniform definition of male and female, combined with
the variety of state regulations governing amendments of birth records,
makes this situation similar to, but significantly more compelling than,
the facts in Morgan. In Morgan, the Supreme Court balanced Virginia's
need to exercise its local police power in separating the races with the
need for national uniformity in the regulation of interstate travel. The
court invalidated the Virginia statute and concluded that seating
arrangements on common carriers crossing state lines "require a single,
uniform rule to promote and protect national travel. 243 The burden in
sex-determination rulings far surpasses the simple burden to change
seats; these rulings force transsex persons to change their legal sex and
potentially their marital status as a condition of entry into a state. The
right to maintain a legally established sex designation is part of the
ability to travel to other jurisdictions. A person's sex is an inextricable
part of the person's identity, and an attempt to disenfranchise persons of
their identity is akin to fencing them out of a state. On balance, the
state's interest in maintaining its own local sex determination rules must
succumb to a person's constitutionally protected right to cross state
lines.
C.

A State Violates the Equal Protection Clause ifIt Imposes a SexClassificationSystem that Relies on Chromosomes, the Ability to
Reproduce, or Gender Stereotypes

When a state determines whether a marriage between a male and a
male-to-female transsex person is a legal heterosexual marriage or an
illegal same-sex union, the state must establish a test for determining the
240. Id. at 381.
241. This decision predated Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), where the
Court ruled that such "separate but equal" accommodations violated the right to equal protection.
242. Morgan, 328 U.S. at 380-81.
243. Id. at 386.
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wife's legal sex.244 When it establishes the factors that distinguish
"males" from "females," the state is creating a sex-based classification
system because (1) it is treating men and women differently and (2) it is
establishing the rules that determine whether a person is either male or
245
female and thus qualified for the state-created right. A state system
establishing the factors that control whether a person is male or female is
equivalent to a state classification system establishing a person's race.
State-created racial classification systems that required anyone with "any
24 6
or prohibited that person
Negro blood" to sit in the back of the bus,
from marrying someone who was legally "white," would be
247
Similarly, sexunconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.
Amendment's
Fourteenth
the
violate
also
may
classification systems
a sexClause,
equal protection command. Under the Equal Protection
classification system that rejects scientific developments in favor of sex
or gender stereotypes should be declared unconstitutional because the
state can neither articulate an important state interest to support its
system nor prove a substantial relationship between the state's interest
248
and the means it uses to accomplish that interest.
1.

The Equal Protection Clause FrameworkRequires a State's
Definitions of Male and Female to Be SubstantiallyRelated to an
Exceedingly PersuasiveState Interest
Courts subject most legislative classifications to the minimalist

244. The discussion in this section applies with equal force to female-to-male transsex persons.
For simplicity and clarity, the analysis will focus on male-to-female transsex persons.
245. An analysis of the scenario presented to the court in Gardiner II, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan.
2002), will aid in the understanding of why these determinations are sex-based. J'Noel Gardiner is a
male-to-female transsex person whose Wisconsin birth certificate was amended to indicate she is a
female. When J'Noel wanted Kansas to recognize her Wisconsin birth certificate and treat her as a
female for purposes of determining the validity of her marriage, the Kansas Supreme Court refused.
If instead the Kansas Supreme Court had been asked to determine the legal sex of a woman named
Jennifer born in Wisconsin and identified as a female at birth, Kansas would recognize her status as
a female. In both cases, Kansas is creating a rule to establish the legal sex of Jennifer and J'Noel. It
is thus creating a sex-based classification system that is valid only if it satisfies intermediate
scrutiny.
246. See Morgan, 328 U.S. at 381.
247. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
248. Even accurate stereotypes cannot be used to justify the state's interest when the state seeks
to bar individuals from opportunities based on gender "tendencies." See United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 541-42 (1996) (holding that equal protection principles, as applied to gender
classifications, mean state actors may not rely on overbroad generalizations about men and women).
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rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. 249 Under this
level of judicial scrutiny, a challenger must prove that the state did not
have a legitimate governmental objective or that the state failed to use
rational means to achieve a legitimate objective. 250 The Supreme Court
has sanctioned the application of heightened scrutiny in two different
scenarios: when the discrimination involves a suspect classification, and
when the discrimination significantly burdens a fundamental right. 1
Courts subject governmental classifications based upon race and national
origin, and state classifications based on alienage, to strict scrutiny.252
Under strict scrutiny, the government must establish that it is using
narrowly tailored measures to further compelling governmental
253
interests.2 53 Few governmental
actions can survive strict scrutiny. 254
Gender classifications, however, are subject to an intermediate level of
review, falling somewhere between the demanding requirements of strict
scrutiny and the permissiveness of rational basis review.255 The
government must prove an exceedingly persuasive justification for its
system, and the means it uses must be substantially related to an
important government goal.256
249. See Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
250. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993); FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 313-14 (1993); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
251. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). Thus far, the
Court has treated the right to interstate travel, id. at 629-3 1, the right to marry, Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978), and the right to vote, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-64 (1964), as
fundamental rights subject to strict scrutiny. Because state sex-classification systems also burden the
fundamental rights to marry and to travel, they should be subjected to strict scrutiny.
252. See City of Clebume v. Clebure Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion).
253. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003).
254. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (noting that scrutiny that is strict in theory is
usually fatal in fact).
255. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 523-24 (1996); Miss. Univ. v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 723-24 (1982).
256. The Supreme Court settled on intermediate review after initially applying only rational basis
review to gender classifications. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) ("A [gender]
classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.") (internal quotations omitted). Only four justices ultimately
adopted the position that gender classifications should be subject to strict scrutiny. Frontiero,411
U.S. at 688 (plurality opinion) ("Classifications based on sex, like classifications based on race,
alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny."). Intermediate scrutiny surfaced as a standard in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976). The Supreme Court confirmed intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard in Virginia,
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The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to ensure that the
government does not subject its citizens to arbitrary classifications.257 In
the early cases brought by transsex persons, the courts limited their
analysis to determining whether individuals who "change their sex" are
entitled to a heightened level of scrutiny as a suspect class. 258 The
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply should not be based upon whether
people who "change their sex" have been determined to be a "suspect
group." It should be based upon whether the state is creating a suspect
"sex-based" classification system. For example, if a state determines that
a person with female-appearing genitalia and breasts is a male because
she has XY chromosomes, the state's definition of "female" must
survive intermediate scrutiny. That is, the state must establish an
exceedingly persuasive justification for its classification system,259 and
the chosen definition may not be based on administrative
convenience or
26
stereotypes of what it means to be a "real" woman. 0
2.

A State's Interests in Refusing to Recognize a Transsex Person's
PostoperativeSex Failto Pass ConstitutionalMuster

Governmental benefits that differentiate based upon sex remain 262
in
261
only two significant areas: military rules, and marriage restrictions.
Although states may have the power to limit marriage to one man and
one woman, the state's test for determining whether a person is legally a
male or a female must be able to withstand scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. The state must articulate an important interest for its
sex-classification system and prove that a substantial relationship exists
between that interest and the means used to accomplish the
governmental goal. States that have refused to treat post-operative
transsex persons as their self-identified sex have relied on several
purported state interests to justify their rulings: (1) the state's public

518 U.S. at 524.
257. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446; Frontiero,411 U.S. at 683; Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
258. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977); Doe v.
Postal Serv., No. C1V.A.84-3296, 1985 WL 9446, at *4 (D.D.C. Jun. 12, 1985); Terry v. EEOC,
No. C1V.A.80-C-408, 1980 WL 334, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 1980).
259. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524.
260. Id. at 541.
261. The federal Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (2000), requires only
men to register with the Selective Service System.
262. See supra note 3.
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policy against same-sex marriage; 263 (2) a post-operative transsex
person's inability to reproduce; 264 (3) a state's inability to change the sex
fixed by God; 265 (4) the need to protect the public from fraud; 266 and (5)
the desire to discourage "psychologically ill persons" from engaging in
sex changes. 267
Although few courts have expressly articulated that their public
policy against same-sex marriages justifies their refusal to recognize a
post-operative transsex person's self-identified sex, it may be one of the
unstated underlying reasons for these rulings. At least one court has
expressly used its view on same-sex marriage to justify denying a
female-to-male transsex person the right to marry as a man. 68 In In re
Nash,26 9 Jacob Nash's birth certificate indicated that he was a male, but
the Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that it was not obligated to issue a
marriage license to Jacob and his future wife because it would be issuing
a marriage license to a same-sex couple.27°
In other words, the Ohio court decided to ignore Jacob's amended
birth certificate and determined that Jacob was female. The court did not
carefully consider this critical determination. Instead, the Ohio court
engaged in circular reasoning. The court cannot use a public policy
against same-sex marriage to invalidate a marriage until after it
determines the sex of the parties. 271 Jacob's marriage is a same-sex
marriage only if he is legally a woman. Whether Jacob is .a man or a
woman for purposes of marriage depends upon how the state determines
a person's sex. Thus, Ohio's public policy against same-sex marriage
should not be used to determine Jacob's sex.

263. See In re Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 31, 2003).
264. See Gardiner11, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002); Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *6.
265. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 223-24 (Tex. App. 1999).
266. See Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
267. See id.; see also Hartin v. Dir. of the Bureau of Records, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1973).
268. Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *6.
269. Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).
270. Id. at *9.
271. The flaw in the court's logic may be illustrated more clearly in a case involving racial
marriage restrictions. If a married couple claimed that they were both black and thus legally married
in a jurisdiction that banned interracial marriage, the court could not rely on its public policy in
favor of same-race marriages to determine that the husband or wife is legally white. It must first
determine the legal race of the husband and wife before it can rely on its public policy against
mixed-race marriages.
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A number of courts have focused on the inability of post-operative
272
transsex persons to produce offspring to invalidate their marriages.
These courts have created sex-classification systems by relying on
dictionary definitions of sex that provide that males are the sex that
fertilize the ovum and beget offspring and females are the sex that
produce ova and bear offspring.273 This justification is unlikely to
survive even rational relationship review under the Equal Protection
Clause because no state requires proof of fertility as a condition of
marriage. Furthermore, because post-operative transsex persons can
neither bear nor beget, reliance upon the ability to reproduce implies that
transsex persons are neither male nor female and thus would be barred
from marrying anyone. Denying transsex persons the right to marry
because of their infertility violates their fundamental right to marry. 274
A Texas court refused to treat a male-to-female transsex person as a
woman by ruling that medicine and law cannot change the sex that was
"immutably fixed by our Creator at birth., 275 State actions based solely
upon religious justifications are unconstitutional.27 6 States cannot use
religion to justify their actions in the absence of a neutral secular basis
for their decisions.27 7 The Texas decision reflects a deeply rooted belief
in an unchangeable binary conception of sex. This belief conflicts with
the current science, and, at least under the Equal Protection Clause,
cannot receive sanctuary based on faith and vague religious
references. 278
Some courts have been concerned that allowing transsex people to
amend the sex indicated on their birth record could result in fraud. No
272. See, e.g., Kantaras II, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Nash, 2003 WL
23097095, at *9; Gardiner I, 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001), rev'd, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan.

2002).
273. Gardiner11, 42 P.3d at 135; KantarasI1,884 So. 2d at 159; Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at
*6.
274. Cf Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12

(1967).
275. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
276. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 566 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983); Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971).
U.S. _ , 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2745 (Jun.
277. See McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., __
27, 2005) (upholding injunction against display of Ten Commandments at courthouse, noting that
"[t]his is no time to deny the prudence of understanding the Establishment Clause to require the
Government to stay neutral on religious belief, which is reserved for the conscience of the
individual").
278. Id.
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recent decisions have relied on this justification, but in 1966, a New
York court denied a transsex person the ability to amend the sex on her
birth certificate, citing the need to protect the public from fraud.279 Only
two years later, another New York court rejected this justification,
noting that the possibility of "so-called fraud" exists, if at all, largely if a
post-operative female who presents as a female is classified as a male.28 °
No court has relied on a fraud justification since 1966, perhaps because
no evidence of a fraud problem has emerged beyond the amorphous fear
expressed by the New York court. Courts that have considered the issue
have probably rejected the argument-an argument more ironic than
convincing-that preventing fraud would be accomplished by forcing
people with a female appearance (and possibly female-appearing
genitalia) to carry identification documents (e.g., a driver's license) that
indicate that they are male.
The final reason that courts have mentioned is that the legal system
should not be used to help "psychologically ill persons,' 281 resolve their
"unhappy mental state." 282 Courts have not used this justification since
1973 and because of developments in medical science should not use it
today. Medical experts agree that transsexuality is not merely a "mental
state. 283 In fact, recent studies support the finding that transsexuality
has a biological basis. 284 More important, standard medical protocol
recognizes that there is no "cure" for transsexuality.2 85 Neither
counseling nor medication will lead a person to conclude that he actually
identifies as the gender assigned to him at birth. A majority of medical
experts currently recommend that transsex individuals live in their selfidentified gender role.286
279. Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (affirming rejection of
request for change in birth certificate because "[t]he desire of concealment of a change of sex by the
transsexual is outweighed by the public interest for protection against fraud").
280. See In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 838 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968).
281. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
282. Hartin v. Dir. of the Bureau of Records, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
283. See supra note 55.
284. Id.
285. The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association (HBIGDA) has
established international standards for the treatment of transsexuality. See HBIGDA Standards of
Care, 6th Version, http://www.hbigda.org/soc.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
286. In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 78 (Md. 2003) ("Although psychotherapy may help the
transsexual deal with the psychological difficulties of transsexualism, courts have recognized that
psychotherapy is not a 'cure' for transsexualism. Because transsexualism is universally recognized
as inherent, rather than chosen, psychotherapy will never succeed in 'curing' the patient ....
Consequently, it has been found that attempts to treat the true adult transsexual
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In sum, the reasons states have advanced to justify a sex-classification
system that focuses exclusively on chromosomal analysis or the ability
to reproduce in lieu of any other factors are unconvincing and logically
unsound. Furthermore, they could not withstand Equal Protection
scrutiny because they are neither compelling nor exceedingly persuasive.
Finally, the legitimacy of using these factors is questionable given the
current scientific understanding of the development of gender-identity
formation.
3.

Sex-ClassificationSystems that Rely on ChromosomalAnalysis or
Ability to Reproduce Violate the EqualProtection Clause Under
Any Standardof Review

In the unlikely event that a court finds that any of the state interests
discussed above are valid, the court must still examine the means used to
accomplish the governmental goal.287 In other words, to be constitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause, the state must prove that using
chromosomes or the ability to reproduce as determinative factors
accomplishes the goal the state is trying to achieve. Defining the terms
"male" and "female" based on inaccurate and misleading criteria does
not further opposite-sex marriage,288 is inconsistent with the state
allowing other infertile couples to marry, does not prevent fraud, and
does not promote psychological well being. Thus, barring transsex
persons from marrying in their self-identified gender role bears no
relationship to the articulated state interests and must fail under all levels
of judicial scrutiny
Furthermore, when a state determines that it will classify only those
individuals who are able to bear children 289 or who have XX

psychotherapeutically have consistently met with failure.") (citation omitted).
287. For purposes of this analysis, this section presumes that the state has a valid interest in
engaging in sex assignment.
288. For example, jurisdictions that have ruled that post-operative male-to-female transsex
persons are still males for the purposes of marriage are allowing post-operative male-to-female
transsex persons to marry women. In other words, two individuals who both appear to be women
(even when they are undressed) are now legally allowed to marry in these jurisdictions. See Cris
Beam, For Better or For Worse?, OuT, May 2000, at 60, 64; Jilly Beattie & Sara Lain, The
Wedding with Two Brides... and One Is a Man!; Lesbian Lovers Both Wear a Dressfor Britain 's
Weirdest-Ever Marriage,THE PEOPLE, June 11,1995, at 2; Afi-Odelia E. Scruggs, Tying Legalities
into Tangled Knot, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 7, 1996, at IB; Michael Vigh, Transsexual
Weds Woman in Legally Recognized Union, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 5, 1999, at IC.

289. See, e.g., GardinerH,42 P.3d 120,135 (Kan. 2002).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 80:819, 2005

chromosomes 29° as women, it is engaging in impermissible sex
stereotyping about what it means to be a "real" woman. 291 These and
other biologic tests ignore scientific studies that establish that sex
features are not binary and many people have incongruent sex
attributes.2 92 Ability to reproduce and chromosomal structure are not
more valid indicators of a person's sex than any other anatomical or
physiological factors. For example, if a state adopted a test for the
determination of sex that defined men according to the size of their
penises and women according to the size of their breasts, it would
undoubtedly fail even the rational basis test. Although chromosomal
make-up and ability to reproduce 293 may be less variable than penis and
breast size, these indicators still evidence that courts are relying on
stereotypes to establish sex. Classification systems based upon unsound
stereotypes do not qualify as an exceedingly persuasive justification and
thus fail to meet constitutional muster.294
Even if a court were to determine that rational basis review is
appropriate, states that have excluded scientific advances in
understanding sex and gender-identity formation in favor of tests based
solely on reproductive capacity or chromosomal structure would not
pass rational basis scrutiny under recent Supreme Court equal protection
jurisprudence. The Court's decision in Romer v. Evans295 suggests that,
when using rational basis review to examine laws purporting to violate
the constitution, the Supreme Court may be moving toward affording
greater protection to sexual minorities. Romer involved discrimination
290. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex. App. 1999).
291. Decisions based upon sex stereotyping are impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause,
as well as under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). Discrimination claims are more often
brought under Title VII than the Equal Protection Clause because employers traditionally
discriminate on this basis more than the government. Although early Title VII actions allowed
employers to discriminate against their transgendered employees, see, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines,
Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982);
Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977), most recent decisions recognize
that discrimination against transsex persons is an impermissible form of sex stereotyping
discrimination, see, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Schwenk v.
Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213
(1 st Cir. 2000). Courts resolving equal protection claims should reach a similar conclusion and not
allow states to rely on sex stereotypes when they establish the rules for determining legal sex.
292. See supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
293. In the U.S., approximately 6.1 million adults, or about 10% of the reproductive age
population, are infertile. See NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 131.
294. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996).
295. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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against gays and lesbians.296 Although the Court avoided a specific
ruling that laws that classify people by their sexual orientation should
receive heightened scrutiny, the Court's rationale in Romer may provide
transsex persons and other sexual minorities with greater protection.
In Romer, Colorado citizens voted to amend the Colorado
Constitution to preclude all legislative, executive, or judicial action
designed to protect the status of persons based on their sexual
orientation, conduct, practices, or relationships. 297 The Supreme Court
found that this amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause because
298
it imposed a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single group.
Furthermore, the Court found that the amendment was motivated by
animus toward a particular group and lacked a rational relationship to
legitimate state interests. 299 The Court stated: "[I]f the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular
3 °°
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.'
Even under the lowest standard of review, states that refuse to
recognize transsex persons as their self-identified sex may violate equal
protection guarantees. When a state defines "male" and "female" in a
way that is contrary to current science and visits a broad disability on
transsex persons, the state's action appears to evidence a bare "desire to
harm a politically unpopular group."3 0' Furthermore, the state cannot
justify its decision on its public policy disfavoring same-sex marriages
because the resulting sex-determination ruling in effect sanctions what
appears to be a same-sex marriage. For example, if a state allows J'Noel
296. Id. at
297. Id. at
298. Id. at
299. Id. at

629-3 1.
622-24.
635-36.
635.

300. Id. at 634 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Romer could be considered to be sui
generis given the breadth of the discrimination imposed by the legislation. In Lawrence, the
Supreme Court confronted a narrower statute that criminalized same-sex sodomy. 539 U.S. 558,
563-64 (2003). The Court decided the statute violated substantive due process principles and
declined to rule on the narrower issue of whether the statute would also violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 574-75. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, found that the law
was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds for two reasons. First, the law evidenced a desire
to harm a politically unpopular group and therefore required a more searching form of rational basis
review. Id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Second, the challenged legislation inhibited personal
relationships. Id. ("We have been most likely to apply rational basis review to hold a law
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause where, as here, the challenged legislation
inhibits personal relationships.").
301. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
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Gardiner, a male-to-female transsex person with breasts and femaleappearing genitalia, to marry another woman, most of society would
conclude that the relationship appears to be a same-sex union. 30 2 Thus,
no rational relationship exists between a state sex-classification system
that relies solely on chromosomes or ability to reproduce and its interest
in limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.
If a state bans same-sex marriages, refusing to allow transsex persons
to marry in the gender role in which they live indicates that the state
action is based solely on an irrational animus against a discrete grouptranssex people. When a state denies transsex persons the right to marry
in their self-identified gender role, the state is inhibiting personal
relationships, and the denial suggests the intent to deny equal protection
to a politically unpopular group. This type of animus has led the
Supreme Court to strike down laws even under a rational basis level of
review, concluding, for example, that the bare "desire to harm a
politically unpopular group" was not a legitimate interest when it
involved hippies,30 3 the mentally retarded,30 4 or gays and lesbians.30 5
Limiting transsex persons to what is essentially a same-sex marriage
appears "not to further
a proper legislative end but to make them unequal
30 6
to everyone else.,
In sum, the rational basis test the Court applied in Romer, a case
involving discrimination against a different sexual minority group,
supports a finding that state classification systems that discriminate
against individuals who fail to conform to chromosomal or reproductive
gender norms are unconstitutional even under rational relationship
review. If these state classifications fail to survive rational basis review,
they would fail, of course, under any heightened level of scrutiny.
D.

The Principlesof Substantive Due ProcessRequire States to
Refrain from Imposing UnwarrantedBurdens on PeopleBased on
Their Gender Identities
When a state insists on treating transsex persons as the sex assigned to

302. After the Texas court's decision in Littleton, two women, who to all outward appearances
appear female, can now legally marry. See, e.g., Todd Ackerman, Marriage,a changing union?
Transsexualwedding shows gender can be a complex issue, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 17, 2000, at 1.

303. See, e.g., Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
304. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985).
305. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
306. Id.
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them at birth rather than the sex that comports with the gender role in
which they live, it is imposing significant burdens on their private and
public lives.30 7 If a state refuses to recognize an amended birth
certificate, it is requiring a transsex person who identifies as a female
and whose outward appearance is female to marry only another female
and to carry identity documents that indicate she is a male.3 0 8 In effect,
30 9
the state would be requiring her to abandon her gender identity.
Whether the state's action can withstand scrutiny under a substantive
due process analysis is questionable.
The Supreme Court has linked, directly and indirectly, the right to
substantive due process to the right of consenting adults to engage in
private sexual acts. 310 No reported decision of any court, however,
discusses whether gender identity is entitled to the same protection as
private sexual acts. When courts are eventually asked to make this
determination, they will be faced with a complicated task, given the
ambiguous Supreme Court decisions about the parameters of the right to
substantive due process. The transformation of the doctrine of
substantive due process from a broad right of privacy to a narrow
guarantee of specific, traditional majoritarian-protected rights has
limited the doctrine. The Supreme Court's most recent statements in
307. When states recognize amended birth certificates under some circumstances but refuse to
acknowledge the amended birth certificates of transsex persons, they are imposing a burden on this
group that they do not impose on any other group. When birth certificates are amended after
adoptions or paternity determinations, they are uniformly recognized. See supra notes 176-78 and
accompanying text.
308. The collateral consequences of a sex determination may be far reaching. In addition to
marital issues, it may also affect: pension or insurance rights; employment issues; the effect of
criminal laws in which gender is an element; the right to medical treatment, work and housing
assignment when serving in the military or confined as part of a civil or criminal proceeding; and
the right to participate in certain sports. See generally Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1; see also Melissa Aubin, Defying Classification: Intestacy Issues for Transsexual
Surviving Spouses, 82 OR. L. REV. 1155, 1190 (2003).
309. The Ninth Circuit has held that requiring a person to abandon her gender identity is
untenable. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[Slexual identity [is]
immutable [and] so fundamental to one's identity that a person should not be required to abandon
[it].").
310. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("The case does involve two adults
who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle.... Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in [private sexual] conduct without intervention of the government."); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding a right to terminate pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972) (striking down law criminalizing distribution of contraceptives); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking down law criminalizing the use of contraceptives
based on marital privacy).
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Lawrence v. Texas,3 1' however, support the conclusion that states that
refuse to recognize a legal change of sex from another jurisdiction
violate a transsex person's right to substantive due process.
1.

The Supreme Court's Substantive Due ProcessRulings Are
Complex, Controversial,and Convoluted

The Supreme Court expanded the doctrine of substantive due process
several decades ago when it used this constitutional theory to prevent a
state from banning the sale of contraceptives. In Griswold v.
Connecticut,312 the Court held that a constitutional privacy interest,
within the confines of the Due Process Clause, protected a married
couple's use of birth control.313 In Griswold, the Court relied heavily on
the existence of a marital relationship,31 4 but seven years later, in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,1 5 the Court extended this constitutional privacy
interest in access to contraception to unmarried persons. 3 16 Although the
Supreme Court made a relatively quick jump from married to unmarried
persons, the protection it afforded sexual privacy was linked to
procreation: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual,married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child. 3 17 The. Court continued to focus on
procreation interests when it considered a woman's right to seek an
abortion in Roe v. Wade.3 18 In Roe, the Court held that the right of
privacy encompassed a woman's right to choose to have an abortion
319
under some circumstances.
320
When the Supreme Court decided Washington v. Glucksberg,
substantive due process was settling into a pattern of regression from the
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 485-86.
Id.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
316. Id. at 453.
317. See id. (emphasis in original). See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(striking down, on equal protection grounds, a criminal statute authorizing the sterilization of thriceconvicted felons, declaring that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race").
318. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
319. Id. at 164.
320. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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protection of privacy interests in Roe. 321 Before the Court would accept a
right as fundamental, it required the right to be carefully described.32 2
Then the Court would find the right to be fundamental only if the
specifically described right was so deeply rooted in this nation's history
and traditions and so "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," that
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed., 323 Given
the severity of this test, few rights would be likely to make it through the
judicial ordeal for a number of reasons.
First, courts could narrowly interpret rights already declared
fundamental under past Supreme Court decisions to restrain their
reach.324 For example, although the right to marry is frequently referred
to as a fundamental right,325 that assertion provides little protection to
gays and lesbians. Courts can easily limit the right by shrinking the
32 6
even
meaning to "a right to marry a person of the opposite sex,,
though courts do not impose the same microscopic limitations across the
board.3 27 Thus, as courts reframe the question, the protection afforded
any particular fundamental right declines. This technique honors creative
word framing more than legal reasoning.
Second, the focus on history and tradition limits protection to rights
that have been endorsed by majorities over time, undercutting the notion
that protection from majority rule in certain circumstances is the point of

any constitutional right.328 Moreover, whether the Court examines a
321. See id. at 720-21.
322. See id. at 721.
323. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
324. Rights treated as fundamental include: the right to privacy, which includes the right to use
contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (married persons); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (extending right to contraceptives to unmarried persons), the
right to an abortion, although the state can make obtaining an abortion difficult, Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992), the right to refuse medical treatment under some
circumstances, Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990), and the right to
guide and control children, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70, 75 (2000); Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923).
325. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-97 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942).
326. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57-58 (Haw. 1993); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d
588, 590 (Ky. 1973); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
327. For example, the Court phrased the right to marry broadly when it invalidated a criminal
statue requiring court approval for the marriage of any parent having child support obligations.
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374; see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 97 (invalidating a regulation prohibiting
inmates from marrying without prison superintendent approval).
328. See generally Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and FundamentalRights,
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general history or tradition (the right to procreate) or a specific history or
tradition (the right to procreate outside of a marriage) will likely alter the
outcome. In addition, whether the Court views history and traditions as
static or evolving will similarly alter the result. For example, in Bowers
v. Hardwick,2 9 the Court emphasized the historical roots of bans on
sodomy rather than analyzing the significance of the fact that, at the
time, over half the states had repealed their sodomy laws.330 In
Lawrence, however, the Court focused on the importance of the evolving
and changing nature of our laws to determine those rights that should be
protected under substantive due process. 33 1 Courts that analyze only
historical understandings of gender role and identity formation will
reach significantly different conclusions from courts that include
developing scientific advances in their analysis.332
In sum, until Lawrence, the substantive due process doctrine seemed
drained of substance through the adoption of a highly restrictive test for
determining fundamental rights.333 Courts further weakened the doctrine
by trimming those fundamental rights already granted.334 The
substantive due process doctrine seemed to offer little hope for
protection of the rights of sexual minorities subjected to discrimination.

57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 101 (2002) (criticizing the use of tradition as a part of a fundamental rights
analysis because it legitimizes past discrimination, limits the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment, supplies a malleable standard, and perpetuates discrimination).
329. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruledby Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
330. Id. at 192-93.
331. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72.
332. Compare Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) (ruling that a postoperative male-to-female transsex person should be treated as a man because the court believed that
only "our Creator" can decide a person's sex), with In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 79 (Md. 2003)
(reaching the opposite conclusion after tracing scientific developments that have enhanced our
understanding of gender formation).
333. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
334. See id. (finding no fundamental right of the terminally ill to determine the manner and
circumstances of death); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992)
(expanding situations where the government may limit a woman's right to have an abortion);
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (finding biological father does not have a
fundamental right to a relationship with biological child when the biological mother is married and
her husband chooses to raise the daughter as his own). But see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75
(2000) (holding that there is a fundamental right of parents to make decisions regarding their child's
care, custody, and control).
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2.

The Lawrence Decision Supports a Findingof a ProtectedLiberty
Interest in a Person'sGender Identity

In Lawrence, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute
criminalizing same-sex sodomy.33 5 The Court overruled its previous
decision in Bowers, which had upheld a similar state statute against a
336
Although
constitutional challenge less than twenty years earlier.
decision
the
ranks,
constitutional
the
from
Bowers
expels
Lawrence
The
process.
due
substantive
govern
jumbled the principles that
Lawrence Court adopted neither of the options that substantive due
process seemed to offer at the time. It did not rule that the right in
question was "fundamental" and strike down the statute under a strict
scrutiny standard; nor did it specifically uphold the statute under a
rational basis test, even though it used language like "legitimate state
interest," a phrase typically reserved for statutes that are upheld under
rational basis review. 337 Instead, the court utilized rational basis
language, but struck down the statute as if it were subject to strict
scrutiny. In other words, it employed "rational basis with bite," a
muddled level of review where the Supreme Court claims to be applying
of the test, 338
the rational basis standard, and often even recites the words
but the reasoning and results resemble the more exacting standard
required by intermediate scrutiny.339
335. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
336. Id. at 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought
not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.").
337. Id. ("The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into
the personal and private life of the individual."); see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 601 (2d ed. 2002) ("The Court has made it clear that economic
regulations... will be upheld when challenged under the due process clause so long as they are
rationally related to serve a legitimate government purpose.").
338. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a ChangingCourt: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 18-22
(1972) (describing a level of equal protection scrutiny labeled "mere rationality" by the Supreme
Court, but applied with a more searching judicial inquiry into the legislative means and ends than
the traditional and deferential "toothless" rational basis review).
339. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (finding state's
zoning provision regarding housing for the mentally retarded failed rational relationship review
because it was based "on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded"); U.S. Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (striking down regulation, on equal protection grounds,
based on impermissible animosity towards hippies and their communes). But see Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-90 (1955) (upholding legislation under classic deferential rational basis
review). See generally Jeremy Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the
Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to ClassificationsBased
on Sexual Orientation,73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2769 (2005).
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In Lawrence, the Court focused more on the concept of "liberty" as
opposed to "fundamental rights." The Court emphasized that "[l]iberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves
liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent
dimensions. 34 ° In addition to this broad endorsement of individual selfexpression, the Lawrence decision also quoted expansive language from
an earlier opinion that upheld a right of privacy in a woman's decision
about whether to terminate her pregnancy.34 1
This endorsement of personal autonomy 342 was mixed with limiting
344
language. It applied only to consenting adults 343 in private spaces.
Nevertheless, the central point of Lawrence is that the Court is willing to
afford constitutional protection to some "intimate and personal
choices,, 345 including the right to engage in sexual behavior with a
same-sex partner. Throughout the opinion, the Court emphasized the
importance of protecting a person's right to choose and downplayed the
government's interest in protecting morality. The Court emphasized that
the government is required to respect "private lives," and not "control [a
person's] destiny" by making private sexual conduct a crime.346
Finally, the Court divorced the liberty interest in sexual privacy from
the right to procreate. At issue in Lawrence was the right to privacy in a
consensual sexual relationship-one that does not have procreation as
any part of its purpose.34 7 The Court created a realm of privacy with
regard to sexuality, unrelated to reproductive and bodily integrity issues

340. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
341. "Matters involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
342. For example, the Lawrence opinion opens with the following general statement:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other
private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other
spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case
involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.
Id. at 562.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 567.
345. Id. at 578.
346. Id.
347. Id.
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such as contraceptives or abortion. Focusing on personal identity, and
specifically sexual identity, the Lawrence majority found a
constitutionally protected liberty interest348that should occupy a space
protected from unjustified state intrusion.
3.

The Lawrence Decision Protectsa Right to Privacy,but Under a
Standardof Review that Is Neither Strict Scrutiny nor Rational
Basis

Lawrence abandoned the rigid Glucksberg framework that severely
limited constitutional protection of privacy interests. What replaces that
analysis is unclear. Although the Court did not explicitly declare that the
conduct examined in Lawrence constituted a fundamental right, it relied
on other cases in which fundamental rights were established or
recognized, such as Roe. In addition, the Court carefully avoided the
buzzwords that would indicate it was applying heightened scrutiny.
Instead, it utilized the traditional rational relationship terminology of
"legitimate" state interest, 349 which should have led to the statute being
upheld.350 The Court appeared to place the burden on Texas to prove the
legitimacy of the law, a burden typically not imposed under rational
basis review.351
By applying neither traditional strict scrutiny nor traditional rational
basis review, the Supreme Court retained the option to decide in the
future, on a case-by-case basis, whether a protected liberty interest
exists. It could apply the standard rational relationship review in cases in
which it does not want to extend the liberty interest. Alternatively, it
could apply the more amorphous Lawrence standard when it does want
to extend the interest.
At a minimum, Lawrence indicates that the binary choice between a
fundamental rights analysis and rational basis review is sometimes
inappropriate in the substantive due process arena. Although the opinion
348. Id. ("The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other,
engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to
respect for their private lives.").
349. Id.
350. Id. ("The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into
the personal and private life of the individual."); see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 601 (2d ed. 2002) ("The Court has made it clear that economic
regulations... will be upheld when challenged under the due process clause so long as they are
rationally related to serve a legitimate government purpose.").
351. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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is imprecise, the balancing of the state interest and the individual interest
is reminiscent of earlier substantive due process cases.352 The state and
individual interests are different from those in the earlier cases and, in
several ways, Lawrence presents a novel assessment of these interests.
By divorcing the right to privacy from the right to make procreative
decisions, Lawrence implicitly expands substantive due process
protection. Lawrence moves closer to recognizing that sexual identities
are not inextricably linked to procreative abilities. The majority opinion
recognizes sexual expression, without the life commitments of
childbearing.3 53
In other words, because Lawrence does not involve the right to
procreate, where life and bodily integrity are at stake, the Court could
have characterized the individual interest as less weighty.354 Yet the
Court imbued the right to engage in private consensual acts with
substantial importance. It recognized the intimate nature of selfexpression unconnected to the potential results or consequences of the
activity.355
On the other hand, because Lawrence involves a balancing of the
individual's interest against the state's interest, Lawrence could be
viewed as only a minor shift in the outer parameters of substantive due
process doctrine. The state's interest in Lawrence-morality-is
amorphous compared to the specific state interests in protecting maternal
health or life that were involved in the abortion and contraception cases.
The absence of any significant state interest, and the Court's willingness
to limit the ability of states to invoke morality with regard to some types
of sexual expression, may mean that the state's burden is more than
minimal in justifying infringements on private sexual expression. The
level of the burden, however, remains an open question.
352. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
353. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
354. Cf Casey, 505 U.S. at 852; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
355. This development in itself is not unprecedented. Even before Lawrence, the Supreme Court
had held that the state could not prevent prisoners from marrying, a situation where their
confinement limited their ability to procreate. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-97 (1987). The
Supreme Court came close to sanctioning a limited "right to sex," by protecting a person's interest
in sexual expression from majority rule. See generally David B. Cruz, "The Sexual Freedom
Cases"? Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
299 (2000). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also rejected the tie to procreation in
striking down Massachusetts's exclusion of same-sex marriage. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961-f64 (Mass. 2003).
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4.

The Right to Gender Self-Identity Should Be Protected Under
Lawrence

Whether a state is violating a transsex person's substantive due
process rights when it continues to define her legal rights based on the
sex assigned at birth, instead of her self-identity as indicated on her
amended birth certificate, requires a careful study of the exact
parameters of Lawrence. First, the right to gender self-identity must be
compared with the right to engage in private sexual acts. Second, the
state's interest in criminalizing sexual conduct must be compared to the
state's interest in limiting a person's right to be recognized legally as the
sex that comports with her gender self-identity. Finally, the Lawrence
Court's explicit statements regarding the limitations of its decision need
to be examined to determine whether these limitations would apply to a
state's power to dictate a person's legal sex. A comparison of these
different claims demonstrates that gender identity is as intimate a choice
as one's sexual partner. In addition, the state's interests in asserting its
need to force gender conformity are as weak as the morality justification
in Lawrence.
If the broad rhetoric in Lawrence is applied in future cases, the right
of transsex persons to gender self-identity should be protected at least as
much as the right to engage in private sexual acts. The Supreme Court
stated in Lawrence that "[m]atters involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 35 6 It is difficult to imagine that one's gender
identity is not within the core of the concept of an "intimate and personal
choice. 3 57 If the choice of one's sexual partner is considered one of the
most intimate and personal choices a person can make, then a person's
choice to live in the sex role that matches her self-identity must also be
included.3 58
The state interest involved in Lawrence-morality-is not the same
as the state interests asserted in the cases that effectively force transsex
persons to conform their lives to the sex assigned to them at birth. The
state interest asserted in these cases, however, may be just as nebulous as
356. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
357. Id.
358. A person's sexual identity is "immutable" and "so fundamental to one's identity that a
person should not be required to abandon [it]." Hemandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093
(9th Cir. 2000).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 80:819, 2005

the state's interest in dictating private adult sexuality. The state
justifications that courts have asserted thus far when refusing to
recognize a transsex person's amended sex include: (1) the state's
interest in banning same-sex marriage; (2) the inability of post-operative
transsex persons to reproduce; (3) the inability of a state to change the
sex fixed by God; (4) the need to protect the public from fraud; and (5)
the desire to discourage "psychologically ill persons" from engaging in
sex changes. 359 For the same reasons that these state interests do not
justify differential treatment under the Equal Protection Clause, they
cannot be used to support an infringement of a person's right to
substantive due process. 360 None could survive a heightened scrutiny
standard, and as discussed in Part III.C they should not survive even
under rational basis review.
In Lawrence, the Court carefully limited the scope of its decision.36 1
Other courts could use this limiting language to justify a decision to
exclude the right to gender self-identity from protection under the
substantive due process doctrine. Although the Supreme Court declared
that the protected liberty interest includes the right to engage in private
adult sexual expression,36 2 the Court differentiated between criminal
charges, 363 with their potential for discrimination and stigmatizing
effects that infringe on "the dignity of the persons charged, '' 364 and
formal state "recognition [of] any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter. 3 65 Thus, the Court carved out same-sex marriage and
military discrimination from explicit coverage. Nothing in the Court's
language in Lawrence, however, explicitly states that they may be
excluded from coverage in the future.
Lawrence involved a criminal prosecution, while the transsex cases
involve the denial of state-controlled rights (marriage and birth
certificates), but these are rights over which the state maintains a
monopoly. One of the problems with comparing the imposition of a
stigma (criminalizing the conduct) with withholding a benefit (civil
marriage and the ability to amend a birth certificate) is that the

359. See supra notes 263-67 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 263-306 and accompanying text.
361. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
362. Id. at 567.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 575.
365. Id. at 578.
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difference is in the characterization or label, while the results are often
indistinguishable. For example, while criminalizing sodomy stigmatizes
the conduct, the fact that prosecutions were rare made the stigma close
to symbolic, leading to no real consequences to a person's daily life. On
the other hand, the withholding of the numerous benefits that society
confers on married persons--emotional, tax, social, and legaleffectively means that the withholding of this benefit inflicts not only a
stigma, but also a real and important penalty on those persons who
cannot partake of it. 366 As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
out sexual minorities from marriage imposes the "stigma
noted, fencing367
of exclusion."
The Lawrence majority also seemed concerned about drawing a
distinction between private and public conduct. 368 The Court limited the
right of the state to interfere in conduct that occurred in private, as
opposed to a public event, such as state-sanctioned same-sex marriage.
Where only sexual acts are concerned, perhaps this distinction makes
some sense. Relationships between same-sex individuals, like those
between opposite-sex individuals, however, do not easily fit into these
separate components. They naturally and routinely spill over into the
public sphere. Personal relationships implicate employment, credit
rating, parenting options, and a host of other activities. Furthermore, a
distinction between private and public with regard to gender identity
cannot be maintained. Sexual acts-at issue in Lawrence-are generally
kept private in our society; a person's gender identity is generally on
public display. Gender identity, like personality, permeates a person's
existence.369 It is not a coat that can be taken off as people cross their
front door.
Although Lawrence fails to provide clear answers to any future
substantive due process questions, even a narrow reading of Lawrence
should result in protecting a transsex person's right to gender selfdetermination. If, as the Court in Lawrence implies, choosing a sexual

366. This Article does not discuss the issue of whether marriage is a good idea or should be
abolished. For this discussion, see generally Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage, 16
QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 27 (1996); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing
Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantlethe Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,"
79 VA. L. REv. 1535 (1993); Dianne Post, Why Marriage Should Be Abolished, 18 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. REP. 283 (1997).
367. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004).
368. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560.
369. See Hemandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000).
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partner is considered to be one of the most intimate and personal choices
a person can make, being able to live in the appropriate gender role
should be similarly protected. Allowing the state to determine the gender
role in which people must live undermines a person's right to personal
dignity and autonomy that cannot be neatly separated into public and
private spheres. The asserted state interests do not meet the requirements
of heightened scrutiny and are arguably not even legitimate reasons
under the Lawrence standard. Accordingly, states that refuse to
recognize a transsex person's amended sex are inflicting a broad public
stigma on protected private decisions; such a state-imposed stigma may
violate a person's right to substantive due process under Lawrence.
CONCLUSION
For many, the idea of male and female as discrete and easily defined
categories is a deeply ingrained concept that reflects a comfortable
binary simplicity. Scientific advances, however, colorfully complicate
what, for many, is a black and white picture. Moreover, medical
technology has made it difficult to ignore that, to some extent, male and
female are fluid categories. Medical experts acknowledge that genderidentity formation is more complex than once believed, may be
controlled by prenatal influences, and may not be subject to
modification. For transsex persons, medicine has provided some
solutions for those who choose to pursue them. Medical and
psychological experts believe that the body's sexual attributes can be
altered to conform to a person's "brain" sex; conversely, no effective
treatment exists to alter the "brain" sex so that it conforms to anatomical
sex. Thus, when transsex persons undergo medical treatment to conform
their sexual anatomy to their self-identity, they have chosen a
fundamental life-altering event that changes their status forever. By
providing the technology and means to alter anatomical sex, science has
acknowledged the problem and provided a solution.
The law's response to these scientific and medical advances has been
less than optimal. Although most European nations and approximately
half of the U.S. states have recognized these scientific developments and
allow transsex persons to amend their birth records, a number of states
have insisted that transsex persons must legally remain the sex assigned
to them at birth. Although this approach may not be enlightened, nothing
in the U.S. Constitution or federal law dictates the manner in which a
state can determine its citizens' sex. If, however, a state's sex test
infringes upon a person's constitutionally protected rights, the state's
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interest in defining sex must yield.
States that continue to define sex based upon a person's chromosomes
or ability to reproduce may violate four constitutional mandates. First, if
a state refuses to recognize a validly amended birth certificate from a
sister state, the refusal violates the state's obligations under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and unconstitutionally infringes on the right to
travel. Even if a state has control over the birth certificate because the
person was born within that state, refusal to amend the birth record of an
intersex or transsex person may violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection and substantive due process commands. If a state
imposes a sex test that is based upon stereotyped notions of what it
means to be male or female, that test results in gender discrimination
that may violate the Equal Protection Clause. Furthermore, if a state
forces people to live in the gender role that does not comport with their
own sense of self, this imposition undermines their right to personal
dignity and autonomy and thus violates their right to substantive due
process.
Courts have been issuing sex-determination rulings for thirty-five
years. During this relatively short time, they have created a variety of
tests to determine sex. These contradictory sex-determination tests have
created an absurd situation: as people cross state lines their legal sex,
marital status, and parental status may all change. Thus far, no court has
carefully examined whether these contradictory rulings can withstand
constitutional scrutiny. As science continues to advance our
understanding of sex and gender-identity formation and as medicine
continues to create new technologies to modify sexual attributes,
litigation on this critical issue will continue. If legal institutions continue
to differentiate between men and women and states remain in the
business of establishing people's legal sex, then courts can no longer
ignore these thorny constitutional questions.

886

